A Welfare Perspective on Nordic Media Subsidies

Abstract: Subsidies constitute a prominent media-policy instrument, serving to correct media-market failures. However, because they interfere in the market, and because the commercial media market is under structural pressure in the digital age, there is much debate about the role of media subsidies. Within this context, this article revisits the foundation of media subsidies in certain developed democracies, aiming at qualifying the current discussions. Focusing on the Nordic countries, the article explores the connection between the social-democratic welfare-state regime and the extensive public frameworks for media subsidies found in this region. The article argues that even though continuity rather than disruption characterizes the systems of direct and indirect subsidies, current developments point toward a recalibration of the ways the Nordic countries subsidize media in the future.

Key words: media policy; media subsidies; the Nordic countries; welfare state

It is nothing new that the economic relationship between the state and the media sector, a relationship that exists in the form of direct and indirect media subsidies, is subject of heated debate. Even so, the discussion has an increased sense of urgency in the digital age where commercial actors in the news industry struggle to identify viable business models for underwriting future news production (Nielsen, 2012; Picard, 2010, 2014). Together with the increased market-orientation and simultaneous deregulation of the media sector over the last decades, the economic strain on the news industry means that state interference in the market is now as contested as ever. A central point in the discussion concerns the role, size, and financing of the public service media, and it is a discussion that takes place across Western democracies and media systems (Barwise & Picard, 2014; OECD, 2010; Syvertsen, Enli, Mjøs, & Moe, 2014; Søndergaard, 2014). However, the discussion is not restricted to the public service media: in Sweden, for example, one study finds decreasing public support for state subsidizing of the press (Ohlsson, 2014).
At its core, the discussion about media subsidies concerns the question of market correction. On the one hand, as the present article discusses in more details below, it is one purpose of media subsidies to compensate for the shortcomings of the media market. On the other hand, commercial actors in the media market likely experience this kind of public funding of parts of the sector as distortion of competition that gives some specific actors (but not others) unfair advantages. So, media subsidies are not a neutral instrument, but rather a political tool for achieving certain policy objectives.

In connection with this discussion and in order to qualify it, taking one step back to revisit and clarify the foundations underlying the public subsidizing of the media is due. Doing so, this article argues that the idea of the welfare state offers a fruitful framework for understanding media subsidies – both because market corrective measures also constitute a central part of what the welfare states does (Briggs, 1961; Greve, 2015) and because there is some convergence between which countries have extensive social welfare programs and which countries have high levels of public funding for the media (cf. Table 1). This does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between the welfare state and media subsidies; there can, of course, be welfare states that do not have media subsidies and vice versa. However, as the article shows, there is an overlap between the objectives and measures of the welfare state in its universalist, social-democratic type (cf. Esping-Andersen, 1990) and the societal aims of subsidizing media.

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Table 1 approximately here.

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The linking of welfare-state theory and the concept of media subsidies is not a new one (see, most prominently, Syvertsen et al., 2014), even though it is often understood implicitly rather than made explicit. However, the contribution from drawing this perspective to the fore is that it emphasizes the geographical and cultural specificity of elaborate media-subsidy schemes and helps explain how democracies with more pervasive public-support frameworks are also likely to subsidize the media. This way, the focus on the connection between
the two phenomena underlines what is special about the way certain states (namely welfare states of the social-democratic kind) interact with and support the media.

The scope of the article is Nordic because of the convergence between the welfare-state regime found in this region and the objectives of media subsidies. Together with a number of Benelux and Central European countries, the Nordic countries belong to what Hallin and Mancini (2004) label the democratic-corporatist media-systemic model. What characterizes this media system is the co-existence of state-owned public service broadcasters and privately owned press and broadcast organizations, institutionalized editorial freedom in the form of the so-called ‘arms-length principle’, and a high degree of journalistic professionalism. Even though some studies challenge the general consensus of similarities between the Nordic countries (e.g., Lund, 2007), recent empirical evidence suggests that Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden form a separate cluster, which is distinct from the other countries in the democratic-corporatist model because of their high level of (direct and indirect) public subsidies to the commercial press as well as the strong position of public broadcasters (Brüggemann et al., 2014; see also Murschetz, 1998; Ohlsson, 2015; Syvertsen et al., 2014).

The Nordic region does not constitute a typical case in an international context; on the contrary, it is a unique one because of the high level of state intervention in both society and media market. It is also unique because the Nordic countries are generally considered among the world’s most developed democracies: in The Economist’s Democracy Index 2015, Norway ranked highest among the 167 countries scored, Iceland was number 2, Sweden 3, Denmark 5, and Finland 8 (The Economist Intelligence Unit, 2016). For these reasons, this body of countries is interesting to study because it can generate important insights into a particular constellation of state/media relationships and its implications for democracy.

**Characteristics of the welfare state**

Before talking about media subsidies and connecting that phenomenon to welfare philosophy, however, it is necessary to outline what constitutes the conceptual framework of the welfare state in general and the social democratic

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1 Iceland is not part of the study by Brüggemann et al. (2014).
iteration of it in particular. Such outlining serves to identify a point of departure for discussing the foundation and development of media subsidies as well as to explain the societal and geographical specificity of the argument put forth in this article.

In the first place, the welfare state is a concept of government where citizenship constitutes a central component in that all citizens enjoy a shared foundation of social, political, and civic rights (Marshall, 1950) in order for state and society to achieve a number of welfare objectives (Greve, 2015). Along the same lines, Briggs (1961: 228, emphasis added) specifies that it is one objective for the welfare state to secure “equality in treatment and the aspiration of citizens as voters with equal shares of electoral power”. This way, he emphasizes the democratic dimension of the welfare state, namely that it exists to enable democratic and participatory citizenship. The welfare state, furthermore, is a type of state that aims at providing some measurement of social security to citizens, offering protection from being left out of society. So, the institutions of the welfare state are “institutions predominantly preoccupied with the production and distribution of social well-being” (Esping-Andersen, 1990: 1) to the citizens.

Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003), more specifically, list three objectives for the state that policy are measurement for achieving for society as well as its citizens, namely political welfare (e.g., democracy and freedom of speech), social welfare (social and cultural benefits), and economic welfare (employment and some extent of financial independence). These types of welfare are mutually connected in the sense that, for example, social and cultural resources (i.e., parts of the social welfare) enable the citizenry to become more informed and thereby strengthen the democratic basis of the political welfare.

Objectives are one thing, means to achieve them another – and the defining and most important means for achieving the objectives of the welfare state is intervention in the market. Briggs, for instance, makes explicit that what characterizes the welfare state is that by the state, “organized power is deliberately used (through politics and administration) in an effort to modify the play of market forces” (1961: 228). This way, the welfare state employs market corrective measures in order to regulate commercial interests and mitigate the negative effects of market failures; that is, the state provides what the market cannot (or will not) because of commercial concerns even though state and society as a whole consider it important and necessary (see also Greve, 2015). The extent of this modification of the play of market forces
depends upon national and societal contexts. For it is tempting to understand the welfare state as one singular way of governing. It is, however, also a temptation one should resist since such an approach does not take into account how different political cultures and traditions, historical contingencies, and socio-economic developments have formed different states and societies differently – and with them the implementation and scope of welfare.

In one influential comparison of welfare systems in Western democracies, Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between a number of “welfare-state regimes” on the basis of historical developments, political traditions, and social data. Welfare-state regimes are ideal-typical multi-state clusters of rationales for and practical implementations of public welfare (see, e.g., Kasza, 2002, for a conceptual critique) and is used to highlight variations across geographical contexts. Esping-Andersen identifies three such regimes: the liberal, the corporatist-statist, and the social democratic one. The liberal regime-type builds upon a philosophy of minimal state interference in the market. Here, limited public welfare schemes are in place to only provide minimally necessary welfare services to citizens; instead, elaborate commercial frameworks exist to accommodate, for example, education, health care, and eldercare. This way, welfare services are considered commodities and are subject to private exchanges rather than public services. The corporatist-statist regime, in contrast, places less importance on the commodification of welfare but generally expect civil society to undertake many welfare objectives; as a rule of thumb, the state will not interfere until citizens’ own possibilities for providing for themselves are consumed. It is, furthermore, characteristic for this welfare-state regime that existing class structures are reproduced through strong links between class, status, and rights.

Esping-Andersen’s third welfare-state regime is the social democratic one. While the liberal and the corporatist-statist welfare regimes propose minimal welfare frameworks that are primarily appealing for the worst-off members of the citizenry, the social democratic one aims at offering welfare services of the highest standard to which all citizens have equal access. This way, this model of the welfare state distinguishes itself from the two alternative models through the emphasis on de-commodified welfare and a fundamental principle of universality. Through equal access to the benefits that the state offers in terms of social security, education, health care, labor-market security, eldercare, etc., it aims at emancipating the individual from the negative consequences of market as well as class structures. So, it provides a framework for the individual to realize her or his potential and facilitate upward social mobility.
This is a framework that is financed through comparatively high tax rates, an extensive public sector, and a large degree of redistribution of wealth in order to finance the welfare programs. Geographically, the social-democratic welfare state is associated with the Nordic countries, which share similarities in spite of differences in the actual implementation of policy programs vis-à-vis private enterprises in the market (Christiansen & Petersen, 2001; Greve, 2007).

**Media subsidies as market correction**

A similar high extent of state interference is found with regards to the media sector as subsidies constitute a central component of media policy in the Nordic countries, representing an instrument for regulating the media market. According to one popular definition, policy is the “web of decisions and actions that allocates values” for the society (Easton, 1971: 130). From that perspective, media subsidies constitute a media-policy instrument in its purest form since they constitute a tool for state actors to control the (public) allocation of financial value among actors in the media industry and thereby regulate the media market; it is through the legislative framework of these subsidies and the administration of it that political actors can support certain types of actors and indirectly weaken other by not supporting them. This way, media subsidies constitute a tool for intervention in the market that can shape and correct undesired conditions.

According to van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003), European media policy experienced a paradigmatic shift in justifications from cultural and political values toward more commercial or technology-driven arguments around the turn of the millennium. This is an argument that seems to support Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) claim that other media systems come to increasingly resemble the Anglo-American liberal model that places primacy on commercial logics as vehicles for media policy and management. However, in her analysis of the subsidizing of Danish newspapers in the post-war period, Flensburg (2015) identifies the opposite development, arguing that the underlying logic rather exhibits increased democratic considerations vis-à-vis commercial ones.

The various perspectives on media policy, which these studies examine, reflect that divergent understandings exist and compete with regard to what “the media” are in the first place. Are they a business sector alongside other sectors (e.g., agriculture) that are necessary for society to be functioning? Or are they
something more – “not just any other business” (McQuail, 2000: 190) – because of their function in informing the citizenry, which makes them a key institution for democratic societies? To the extent that the latter is the case, which does not rule out that the media work on a commercial basis, media subsidies can be understood as an instrument to counter the negative consequences of radical commercialization processes, where the selection and presentation of news are highly influenced by self-serving, commercial rather than journalistic and societal considerations (cf. McManus, 2009), So, they can constitute a market corrective measure for the welfare state to ensure the quality journalism and diversity in the media that is necessary for maintaining an informed citizenry and a vital democracy (Pickard, 2014; Schudson, 2008).

The Nordic history of media subsidies goes a long way back, and an inherent reflection of power structures was clear from the start. In Denmark, for example, the king introduced postage privileges to “royally favored” publishers of periodicals as early as 1723, allowing certain newspapers to be distributed by the postal system at a reduced rate (Lund & Lindskow, 2011). The condition for this privilege, however, was that publishers submitted themselves to censorship from the ruling authorities, and so this subsidy arrangement held limited democratic value. Such clientele arrangements can still be found in, predominantly, Southern European media systems with high degrees of political parallelism (Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004), but they do not reflect the historically most common justification for media subsidies, namely that they serve a democratic purpose and support a greater, common good (see, e.g., Lowe, 2015).

Direct and indirect subsidies

On a practical level, media subsidies can be both direct and indirect, offering different instruments for modifying the play of market forces and compensating for market failure. Direct subsidies, on the one hand, are those that consist of funding directly transferred from the state to the subsidized party. Indirect subsidies, on the other hand, is when there is no direct transfer of funding, but where other arrangements are in place to either generate revenues or alleviate expenditures for the subsidized party (see also Nielsen & Linnebank, 2011). This category of subsidies offers more space for alternative arrangements and comes in various shapes and forms.
Direct media subsidies primarily relates to the newspaper market, even if two of the Nordic countries (Finland and Iceland) also use direct subsidizing to fund the public service broadcasters (see below). In Norway and (to some extent) Sweden, such press subsidies are granted to so-called “second newspapers”; that is, the newspapers in local or regional markets that are not market leaders but represent an alternative to the dominant newspapers or the newspapers that are too limited in terms of circulation and/or frequency to be economically sustainable. This way, the direct subsidies are used specifically for ensuring diversity, supporting the democratic ideal of plurality. In Denmark, press subsidies are granted indiscriminately of market position or size; instead, this county uses journalistic production (i.e., the contribution to democracy) as the central measurement for subsidy eligibility. In Finland and Iceland, direct press subsidies are almost non-existing, and apart from frameworks for indirect subsidies in Finland in the form of, for example, VAT exemptions and distribution support, the press operates on purely commercial conditions in these countries (Ohlsson, 2015; see also Nielsen & Linnebank, 2011; Picard & Grönlund, 2003).

When it comes to indirect subsidies, one popular measure is the reduction of or even exemption from value-added taxes (VAT; see Colbjørnsen, 2014; Ots, Krumsvik, Ala-Fossi, & Rendahl, 2016). In the Nordic countries, this instrument is particularly prominently connected with the press. Finnish, Swedish, and Norwegian data show that for the press, the financial value of indirect subsidies exceeds that of direct subsidies by a considerable margin (Ots et al., 2016); the same pattern is found in Denmark (Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015). However, since it uses circulation figures as the basis for calculating, this type of indirect subsidies is a fragile component of a business model for newspaper organizations – when newspaper readership decreases and with it sales figures, so does the value of VAT exemption on newspaper sales. In Denmark, for example, the estimated value of this instrument for the news industry decreased from 1,100m DKK in 2007 to 477m DKK in 2014 (Rambøll, 2009; Taxation, 2016).

Another type of indirect media subsidy is the license fee that finance the public service broadcasters constitute. Across Europe, public service broadcasting constitutes the most pervasive measure for state intervention in the media market (Curran, Iyengar, Lund, & Salovaara-Moring, 2009), but the exact arrangement for this intervention differs.

Despite media systemic similarities, there are differences in how the Nordic countries finance their public service broadcasters, and both indirect and direct
subsidy frameworks are in place for this particular body of media organizations. In Denmark, the public service broadcaster DR collects license fees, the size of which is determined by the parliament; in Finland, YLE is financed through progressive taxation of the individual taxpayer; in Iceland, RÚV gets funding partly from a fixed tax, partly from advertising; in Norway, the same system as in Denmark is in place – even though the current policy drift suggest that the license fee will be replaced by a taxation arrangement (see "Avtale om allmennkringkasting," 2016); and in Sweden, the same system as in Denmark is in place (see Engblom, 2013, for a more detailed overview). This way, two of the Nordic countries (Finland and Iceland) finance their public service broadcasters with direct subsidies through taxation while two (Denmark and Sweden) employ indirect subsidies in the form of license fees collected by the public service broadcasters but determined by the parliament. One country (Norway) operates by the latter model but finds itself somewhere in a transition process, likely moving toward a framework of direct subsidizing of the public service broadcaster.

Media subsidies as welfare policy

To reiterate: what characterizes the social-democratic welfare regime of the Nordic countries is the existence of public structures and institutions that intervenes in the market and is universal in the sense that all citizens are equally entitled to its services and benefits (Briggs, 1961; Esping-Andersen, 1990; Greve, 2015; Marshall, 1950). Market correction plays a most important part in the toolbox of this type of welfare state since the state employs subsidy frameworks precisely as counterweights to the negative consequences that may come from the activities of the market (first and foremost that certain activities will not be conducted because they are not economically profitable; second because that quality will be compromised to reduce production costs).

This dimensions of the welfare philosophy resonates with one of the most common justifications for public service broadcasting, namely that it exists to produce and disseminate programs and content that the commercial market does not underwrite (see, e.g., Syvertsen, 1999). This content typically includes “narrow” programming such as documentaries, arts and culture programs, and children’s television, which usually cannot attract audiences large enough to make their production economically viable in themselves, even though many consider it important for society because of its societal or cultural value in and of itself.
So, to begin with, media subsidies constitute a measure for the state to compensate for market failures and thereby intervene in the media market. It is obvious that when the state allocates funding to commercial entities such as privately owned newspapers, that act obscures the workings of the market because it grants some actors a competitive advantage they would not necessarily have otherwise. The question, then, is whether media subsidies constitute a part of a welfare framework – for if that is not the case, they could as well be understood as business support rather than as a component of the welfare state.

The aim of the welfare state is to ensure social citizenship for all citizens (Marshall, 1950). There are a number of dimensions to such citizenship, and they assume both formal and informal characters while some of them are also political in nature. Among the most important ones is the capability for citizens to enact their citizenship through participating in the political process in both formal (casting votes in elections) and informal ways (participating in the political discussion in the public sphere). In order to enact such political agency and participate in and vitalize democracy, citizens need to have knowledge and stay informed about developments and discussions in society, and they do that primarily through the news media (Newman, Levy, & Nielsen, 2015; Schudson, 2008).

On this basis, media subsidies can be considered a part of the framework of the social democratic welfare state: media subsidies are one instrument for the state to support the general informing of the citizenry and, thereby, support the vitality of democracy and its institutions. For this reason, media subsidies are not just business support for one particular industry (even though it does, naturally, support the particular businesses of the news industry); first and foremost, it is support for democracy and, consequently, the welfare of the citizens. That is also the reason why the concluding report from a committee that mapped the Danish press subsidies in 2011 and outlined possible future scenarios was called “Democracy Support” (The Agency for Libraries and Media, 2011; title translated by the author).

However, just like the media sector is “not just any other business” because it rests upon a democratic foundation, media subsidies are not just any other welfare service provided by the welfare state. Deeply embedded in the ideology as well as social function of journalistic quality media is, namely, the importance of independence from editorial interference (Deuze, 2005). Institutionalized as well as formally guaranteed freedom of the press and editorial independence constitute cornerstones in the democratic function of
journalism and the media, and state intervention in the media sector in the form of subsidies to the media can compromise such freedom and independence. This is the reason why, for example, countries in liberal media systems such as the US and (to a smaller degree) UK ones are reluctant to subsidize the news media (cf. Hallin & Mancini, 2004). So, there is a delicate balance between, on the one hand, funding the media and, on the other, maintaining freedom from interference in editorial matters. In this regard, media subsidies are different from other welfare services because the relationship between dependence and independence from the state will often be a delicate balance.

The regulation of different media markets is furthermore an intricate business because the markets are increasingly converging. When it comes to different types of media, there are different regulatory (and, consequently, subsidy-related) logics in place. Taking his point of departure in the American media landscape of the early 1980s, Pool (1983) distinguishes between three models for regulating media: the free press model, where the relative low barriers for entry on the market reduces the rationale of state interference; the broadcast model, where scarcity of frequencies means that some public authority oversees access to them; and the common-carrier model that applies to telecommunications, and where a large degree of state intervention is the means to avoid monopolies over critical information infrastructures.

This basic distinction between various types of media and the rationales for regulating them remain influential today, even though convergence processes have changed the constellation of the media markets radically (Freedman, Henten, Towsø, & Wallis, 2008). A comparative analysis of media subsidy frameworks finds that across Western democracies such frameworks are largely “frozen” because they remain structured around the traditional media sectors of print publishers and (radio and television) broadcasters instead of adapting to the digital and increasingly converged media environment (Nielsen, 2014). Such path dependent configurations of media subsidies also exist in the Nordic countries where different subsidy schemes and pieces of regulatory legislation are in place for, respectively, newspaper publishers and broadcasters (Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015; Ohlsson, 2015).

A similar dependence upon “old” frameworks is found in connection with the organization of VAT exemption on newspaper sales: with the exception of Norway, none of the Nordic countries have harmonized VAT rates across the offline/online divide. So, in Denmark, Iceland, Finland, and Sweden, the VAT rate is notable lower on physical news-products (i.e., printed newspapers) than on digital ones (Colbjørnsen, 2014; Ots et al., 2016) so that the regulatory
Changes and challenges

So, this article argues that media subsidies constitute a part of the public welfare system found in the Nordic, social-democratic welfare regime since they represent an instrument for the state to intervene in the media market in order to create welfare for its citizens. This welfare is, particularly, of the political kind (cf. the distinction made by van Cuilenburg & McQuail, 2003) since it aims at democratic purposes. The question, then, is how recent transformations to the concrete configuration of that welfare regime influences the public support for the media, and what consequences that will have for the vitality and democratic order of society.

For a number of recent developments challenge the normative foundation under media subsidies to the extent they are considered a part of the public welfare system. Since the 1980s, the media as well as the political system have experienced an increased market orientation both in the Nordic region and internationally. This shift in political alignment means that the traditionally social democratic welfare state has been pruned as less public funding supports the core services of a wide range of welfare institutions. There have also been fluctuations in some parts of the media-subsidy system (in the press, particularly), even if they can be at least partly explained by other, structural factors such as decreasing circulation and readership (Nielsen, 2012) as well as increased competition from digital intermediaries such as Google and Facebook (Foster, 2012).

Reflecting international developments since the 1980s in the direction of increased deregulation of the media, the public service broadcasters find themselves in a changed political climate, even if the financial situation outlined by the state remains relatively stable. As the financial conditions for the press deteriorate, calls for more restrictions on what public service broadcasters can do have increased, prompting state-owned and license-financed media to show some restraint (The Association of Danish Media, 2013, 2014; Olufsen, Finslo, Indrøy, & Markussen, 2014). Concrete proposals include the establishing of mandatory log-on to the public service broadcasters’ online offerings (proposed in both Norway and Denmark) as well as limits as to which types of news reporting they are allowed to present on websites; both
proposals are aimed at keeping public service broadcasters from undermining the already fragile business model of selling online subscription.

This way, the political discussion about how different subsidy-eligible actors in the Nordic media market behave and relate to each others experiences a shift this year. While media subsidies have traditionally been understood and justified in terms of their contribution to society and democracy, market-based arguments about the competitive situation for the privately owned, commercial media have become increasingly prominent in the media-political discussion (Søndergaard, 2014). This shift does not necessarily change the underlying logic of media subsidies, but it does signal a potential shift in the way policymakers, stakeholders, and media organizations think about it.

In their book on “The Media Welfare State”, Syvertsen et al. (2014) argue that even though major transformations occur in both the media and society these years, the Nordic model of the welfare state, its media-systemic constellation, and the interdependent relationship between the two represents a stable approach characterized by continuity rather than radical change. While that is likely the case, the shifts in the political discourse on media subsidies as well as the recent revisions of some parts of the subsidy framework (Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015; Ots et al., 2016) point in the direction of future recalibrations of the logics and measures that characterize media-subsidy policies in the Nordic welfare states.

Such recalibrations are, however, complicated by the larger structural context that the Nordic countries are part of, namely the European Single Market. The single market is built around the free movement of goods, capital, services, and people and has strict rules concerning state aid in order to avoid distorted competition between domestic and foreign actors. This way, EU trade policy imposes restrictions as to what the state can actually do for actors that operate in a market (see, e.g., Mortensen, 2006, for a discussion of the implications on this regulation). However, the Nordic countries interpret subsidizing media differently, arguing along the lines of the social-democratic welfare state that it is a culture policy measure rather than trade policy one because the media are more for society than just a business. Even so, considerations of the structural conditions that the EU legislation represents must be taken into account in

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2 Norway is not part of the European Union, which is the organizational body behind the single market. Through the EEA agreement, however, the country has adopted most of the EU legislation concerning the single market and is part of the trade cooperation (with the possibilities and constraints that come with it).
future policy changes concerning media subsidies to avoid a conflict with the rules of the single market.

More research is, however, needed to empirically and theoretically examine the scenarios for and consequences of current and future developments in the social-democratic welfare state and its subsidizing of the media, both on a national level and with reference to the wider context of the European Union.

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Table 1: Public funding for public media and social expenditures (years in parentheses). Sources: Benson and Powers (2011, p. 61) and OECD (2016).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Per Capita Public Funding (US Dollars)</th>
<th>Social Expenditures (% of GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>130.52 (2008)</td>
<td>30.2 (2014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>90.70 (2009)</td>
<td>23.0 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>71.65 (2008)</td>
<td>22.0 (2012)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>57.87 (2008)</td>
<td>27.7 (2012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>54.03 (2009)</td>
<td>23.1 (2011)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>34.01 (2008)</td>
<td>18.3 (2012)</td>
</tr>
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