We are all foreigners in an analogue world: cybermaterial alliances in contesting immigration control in Stockholm’s metro system

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ABSTRACT

Public spaces are often contested sites involving the political use of sociomaterial arrangements to check, control and filter the flow of people. In Sweden, the recently established police project (REVA) in is an attempt to strengthen ‘internal border’ controls. This paper discusses the emergence of practices in which activist groups organized and performed resistance through the use of counter technologies in the transport sector. We explain how a hybrid alliance of human and nonhuman others generated new virtual and urban spaces and provided temporary autonomous zones, to groups of undocumented immigrants. REVA Spotter, for example, was a tool, a manifesto and a peaceful means of resistance to the REVA policing methods through continuous Facebook status updates on identity checks at metro stations in Stockholm. The technology enabled reports on location and time of ticket controls to warn travellers in real time. Attempts by authorities to exert control over the ‘spatial’ underground were thereby circumvented by the effective development of an alternative infrastructural ‘underground’ consisting of assemblages of technologies, activists, undocumented immigrants, texts and emails, smart phones and computers. Based on ‘netnographic observations’ and interviews, the paper utilizes the case of the REVA to illustrate processes and practices that simultaneously configure the powerful surveyor, the discriminated and those who contest these politics through hybridities of cyber/material, human/nonhuman and urban/virtual space. The paper argues that by configuring such hybrid alliances, activists provided cyber-material autonomy to undocumented immigrants and other travellers in the metro, thereby creating new virtual and urban spaces for mobility and flows.
For seven generations there had been nothing in the world more important than that wall. Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was outside depended upon which side of it you were on. (Le Guin, 1975)

Public spaces are often contested sites involving the political use of socio-material arrangements to check, control and filter the flow of people (see Virilio, 1995; Virilio & Polizzotti, 1977). In recent years, especially in Europe, the extension of physical identification checks beyond national borders has become an integral practice of immigration control policy (Squire, 2010). Such policies can include configurations of state-of-the-art policing technologies for delineating and demarcating borders of various kinds, as well as for identifying and displacing undesired subjects. A case in point is a recent project on the part of public authorities in Sweden, the so-called ‘Legal and effective execution of policy’ (REVA), for strengthening so-called internal border controls. As mandated by both Swedish and EU immigration policy, the purpose of internal border controls is to carry out identification checks at ‘internal’ sites within member states, often far from national borders. The task of the REVA project was to establish citizenship identification checks at subways and other transport hubs, with the aim of identifying, arresting and deporting undocumented immigrants. The choice of name for this project is interesting, since REVA in Swedish means ‘to tear’ or ‘to rip’. This is exactly what this project aimed to do: ‘It did not just materialise the border by defining who is allowed to cross and who is not, it also tore a society and left a split in the social fabric’ (Keshavarz & Zetterlund, 2013).

In response to the REVA identification checks, local activists in Stockholm configured and used social media to spread awareness about structural interpretations of the controversial nature of the REVA project and its relation to issues of urban justice. They also created virtual platforms that were designed to provide alternative routes of travel in the metro system. Social movements have a long tradition of appropriating mainstream media technologies and reinventing their use in creative, often subversive ways not intended by their designers (Croeser, 2014; Rodríguez, Ferron, & Shamas, 2014). As we will show, the configuring and alternative use of mainstream technologies by activist groups sought to provide ‘temporary autonomous zones’, TAZ (Bey, 2011) to groups of undocumented immigrants. This paper will explore how activists configured both hybrid alliances of human and nonhuman others and new virtual and urban spaces in order to resist the REVA bordering practices. We develop an analytical framework for understanding the ways in which intertwining of activists and cyber-material arrangements (e.g. activists, mobile phones, virtual platforms, undocumented immigrants, metro turnstiles) contributed to creating autonomous spaces that allowed for both circumventing REVA bordering practices and enrolling others in resisting these practices. The paper will address the following questions:

- How did activists in Sweden configure and extend new cyber-material alliances to mobilize resistance to the bordering practices and politics of the REVA project?
- How did activists in Sweden situate and give meaning to their practices?
- What are the theoretical implications of this case for understanding the role of (what we will call) cyber-material autonomy in constituting activism and resistance?

This paper is organized as follows. First, we will situate the paper theoretically within the three areas of social science research that provide the theoretical context for our study, namely border studies, work on social media, and science & technology studies (STS). Then we will describe our methodology and source material. We will provide an empirical background to the Swedish REVA project and its relation to current Swedish and EU immigration policies, followed by an analytical description of activists’ practices and meanings in resisting this project. The paper will conclude with a discussion of the implications of our results for understanding of the role of cyber-material autonomy in constituting political activism.
Situating the study: border studies, social media studies and STS

The interdisciplinary area that is broadly referred to as border studies has a long history that dates to the late nineteenth century with initial work on the geography of boundaries, frontiers and borders as concrete, empirical phenomena (Kolossov, 2005; Paasi, 2005). The field has subsequently been developed by scholars within sociology, anthropology, psychology, political science, international law, history and international relations. Since the 1990s, stimulated in part by political events such as the fall of the Berlin wall, the study of borders has been revitalized, as reflected in both new approaches and a diverse community of border scholars and practitioners (Newman, 2006; Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009; Wastl-Walter, 2011).

As with other interdisciplinary areas, there is no one ‘border theory’ or singular perspective that unites the field (Newman, 2006; Paasi, 2005; Wastl-Walter, 2011). Recent scholars have pointed to a shift from the concept of borders as territorially fixed sites to an interest in exploring the ways in which borders are dynamic, fluid phenomena that embody social, cultural and political processes (Johnson et al., 2011; Newman, 2006). One cluster of recent work that is highly relevant for our purposes points to the importance of analysing borders as processes or practices, as bordering practices (Millner, 2011; Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2009, 2012). This perspective emphasizes the work of bordering and its symbolic and material implications (Rumford, 2009). As put forth by scholars within critical border studies, the work of bordering refers to ‘the activities which have the effect of constituting, sustaining, or modifying borders’ (Parker & Adler-Nissen, 2012, cited in Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729), such work is also done by non-state actors such as ordinary citizens, groups and organizations. This conceptualization underscores the performativity of borders and border politics, an approach that is partly inspired by the work of Butler (Johnson et al., 2011):

Borders do not simply ‘exist’ as lines on maps, but are continually performed into being through rituals such as the showing of passports, the confessionary matrix at the airport, and the removal of clothing ... Moreover, practices of bordering and de-bordering are not just performed as theatrical spectacles, but are also shown to be performative of particular socio-economic and political realities and subject-positions. (Parker & Vaughan-Williams, 2012, p. 729)

Bordering practices thus demarcate ‘physical and symbolic markers of difference’ (Diener & Hagen, 2009, p. 1198). Weber and Bowling (2011, p. 354) note that ‘stop and search’ practices, which are specifically relevant here, historically have been directed towards those subjects at social, legal and economic margins who are perceived as being outsiders. Contemporary bordering work ‘marks some bodies as legitimate and others as out of place’ (Johnson et al., 2011, p. 61). In the specific context of migration, security and policing practices perform the illegality of the migrant, often constituting the migrant as a ‘dangerous citizen’ (cf. Panourgia, 2009). This concept of bordering work as multi-sited linkages of materialities and politics is central to our perspective. Similarly, previous research has focused on artefacts and practices related to the ‘high tech’ of the state and its implication for the position of migrants (Dijstelbloem & Meijer, 2011). In this paper, we go one step further and argue that the ontology of bordering also implies processes of dissidence and resistance (cf. Galis & Lee, 2014) in terms of material and online activism.

Within work on social media, there has been a profound excitement around social movements’ uses of social media that has spilled over into academic research, leading to a wave of studies on social media and their relation to social unrest, dissent and immigration (see e.g. Rodriguez et al., 2014). In particular, the so-called Arab Spring protests in 2009–2013 and the Occupy mobilizations across Europe and North America in 2010–2011 have attracted significant attention (see e.g. Castells, 2012; Costanza-Chock, 2012; Dahlgren, 2013; Hill, 2013; Juris, 2012; Penney & Dadas, 2014). Similar focus has been given to European activist groups that
combine protest action on the streets with extensive use of social media (Chadwick, 2013; Schierup, Ålund, & Kings, 2014). Hands (2011) argues that the rise of social media offers a possibility for collective horizontal communicative action and lends itself to practices of dissent, resistance and rebellion. Academics have extensively researched how activists configure their own technologies and platforms. Among else, there are now analyses of free and open-source software (Coleman, 2013), Indymedia (Milioni, 2009; Sullivan, Spicer, & Böhm, 2011), Wikipedia (Konieczny, 2009) and hacker spaces (Kostakis, Niaros, & Giotitsas, 2015) that extensively discuss how activists attempt to create or modify technologies for their own purposes (Coleman & Golub, 2008; Jordan & Taylor, 2004), including the work of digital liberties activists (Croeser, 2014; Postigo, 2012).

However, recently some researchers have argued for more critical or nuanced accounts of the intertwining of digital applications and activism. Online technologies have puzzled researchers ‘as to their effects on civic activism and have posed questions as to whether activism has been refreshed, extended, or simply placed in new technological, communicative, and institutional contexts’ (Tsatsou & Zhao, 2016, p. 1). Tsatsou and Zhao express concerns as to ‘whether just technical means or also technologically mediated forms of human agency are mobilized’ (ibid., p. 1) in civic activism. Building on this literature, we aspire to conceptualize and problematize expressions of hybrid intertwining of activist and cyber-material arrangements. We argue that research on social media and activism should further focus on methodologically and conceptually understanding the intertwining of human actors, social media and the material urban environment in constituting politics of resistance against analogue bordering practices.

Work on activism within science & technology studies, STS has explicitly focused on critical participation in (or resistance to) controversial techno-scientific practices, projects or systems. Much work has emphasized the role of various forms of knowledge production (e.g. lay knowledge, local knowledge, indigenous knowledge, research in the wild) and the involvement of social groups in such knowledge production (Epstein, 1995; Jasanoff, 1997, Martin, 1996, Rabeharisoa & Callon, 2002; Woodhouse, Hess, Breyman, & Martin, 2002; Woodhouse, 2005). An important focus has been exploring specific sites or contexts within which knowledge production is embedded, e.g. health movements, feminist movements, hybrid forums, publics (Bammer & Martin, 1992; Breyman, 1997; Callon, Barthe, & Lascoumes, 2009; Marres, 2007; Melissa, Scoones, & Wynne, 2005). Over the last decade, STS researchers have turned their interest into the role of social media in sociotechnical controversies. However, it has been argued that STS studies have ‘primarily used digital settings in a rather instrumental fashion’ (Marres & Moats, 2015, p. 3). Yet analyzing digital practices, and therefore digital activism, without considering cyber-material alliances creates critical gaps in understanding the complex relations, negotiations, interactions and effects between human and nonhuman entities in constituting politics against analogue bordering practices.

Within STS, the concept of cyber-material alliances has links to approaches for understanding linkages between materiality, the body and agency within both actor-network theory (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987; Law & Hassard, 1999) and feminist STS (cf. Haraway, 1991). As Haraway (1991, p. 149) notes specifically regarding the concept of cyborg, ‘a cyborg is a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction’. Thus, while the concept of cyborg focuses on materially embedded subject positions and the body politics associated with these positions, our approach centres around temporal, spatial and cyber aspects of interactions between humans and nonhumans (specifically through TAZ, see below).

Actor-network theory’s (ANT) relational and empirical sensibility is fruitful in underscoring the importance of the ‘symmetry’ between human and non-human actors in analysing sociotechnical phenomena. However, ANT’s ‘agnosticism’ (cf. Callon, 1986; Latour, 1981) and post-ANT’s ‘pragmatism’ (Latour, 2007; Marres, 2007)
are accused of disregarding troublemakers and otherness that is incom- patible with its central tenets (Papadopoulos, 2011). Expressed another way, ANT has a blind spot for processes of politicization. In contrast, our theoretical and empirical focus in this paper is to pay attention to the role of nonhumans (specifically digital media) specifically in enacting resistance and creating political autonomy, here in response to the bordering practices of REVA. We are particularly interested in those intertwinings of activists and social media that redraw the material conditions at stake in a way that forces the constituted order, i.e. the Swedish bordering practices, to ‘rearrange itself ’ (Papadopoulos, 2011, p. 194). Rather than merely identifying the issues in a sociopolitical vacuum, we are thus interested in how the activist ‘agency’ arises and resists state border practices by creating spaces for cyber-material autonomy. In other words, besides providing a means of understanding the hybrid practices by which political resistance is constituted, our concept of cyber-material autonomy can be viewed as a means of politicizing ANT.

Bringing together perspectives from border studies, social media studies and STS should offer an understanding of the role of hybrid alliances that seek to establish alternative spaces for enacting politics. To do this, we will also draw upon the concept of temporary autonomous zones, TAZ as devel- oped by Bey (2011). TAZ are not ‘established’ or formally recognized areas because state bureaucracy does not have proper legal or discursive tools to define them. Instead, TAZ refers to spaces that are temporarily disconnected from an omnipresent state (established cyber-material autonomy in form of bordering practices): ‘the TAZ is ... a guerrilla operation which liberates an area (of land, of time, of imagination) and then dissolves itself to re-form elsewhere/elsewhen, before the State can crush it’ (ibid.). In our context, the configuration of TAZs corresponds to the creation of spaces – both virtual spaces and spaces in urban environments – that were designed to contest and circumvent the REVA practices. We will argue for the importance of understanding the ways in which cyber-material alliances can create temporary autonomous zones as new spaces for political resistance.

Methodology

Based on this paper’s focus on developing a suggestive analytical framework at the intersection of border studies, social media studies, and STS, the set of methods used here constitutes an explora- tory approach that we argue can be extended to larger and more in-depth research endeavours in the future. We present initial findings from a small-scale, qualitative online interview study with a small number of activists regarding the role of social media in the resistance movement against the REVA project. We use a mixed set of methods consisting of web-based observations of relevant social media sites and platforms, as well as analysis of documents and materials concerning border practices in Sweden and the EU.

Specifically, we conducted web-based interviews with three activists, guaranteeing anonymity and asking their participation in both configuring the issues and reflecting upon their experiences. In other words, we sought empirical evidence from a ‘ground-level view of the activists’ (Gerbaudo, 2012). Rather than interviewing a larger number of activists, we chose to focus, in line with our approach as an exploratory study, in depth on a small number of activists. Personal contacts with many activists who are engaged in resisting immigration control gave us access to a range of potential interviewees. From this group, we selected three activists, where selection was guided to represent a range of previous experience of, and approaches to, political activism. These approaches can be roughly mapped onto Kriesi’s et al. (1995) typology of movements as either instrumental, countercultural or subcultural. Instrumental, countercultural, and subcultural social movements respond differently to a given strat- egy of the political authorities, or to a given configuration of power. Subcultural movements mobilize the least frequently, because of their strong internal orientation.
Their identity-based logic of action, however, produces strong ties within the movement. Instrumental movements are in some way their antithesis since they have a stronger external orientation. Countercultural movements show a higher frequency of mobilization, especially where repression is strong. Yet radical actions are always less facilitated and more easily repressed than moderate ones. Hence, compared to instrumental movements, countercultural movements always face higher mobilization costs (ibid.).

The interviews were conducted by sending out written, reflection-oriented questions to activists. The activists submitted their responses by email and the content of these responses were then anonymized and analysed. Following Galis and Hansson (2012), cooperating with activists did not mean being dogmatic or uncritical to activists’ beliefs and social media practices (see also Gillan & Pickerill, 2012). During these interviews, the activists informed us about their work on digital media and identified specific Facebook sites that they interacted with (such as Reva Spotter stop the metro police; Red Metro Line against REVA – stop hunting undocumented immigrants; Green Metro Line against REVA), as well as Twitter accounts/hashtags (such as @REVASpotter, #REVA, #REVAspotter, and #REVAjouren). These internet locations became the sites to apply elements of netnographic techniques, focusing on the period the REVA project was active (2008–2014). According to Kozinets (2010), netnographic data collection includes ‘direct copy’ from the internet-mediated exchanges of online community members and observations of the community and its members, interactions and meanings. We manually scrutinized activists’ exchanges (such as Facebook posts and tweets that included both pictorial and textual data) on the aforementioned sites, accounts and hashtags, which entailed examining several hundred messages that were posted during the period that REVA was active (2008–2014), with a particular focus on messages that were posted from the introduction of REVA in Stockholm in late 2012 until 2014.

The work entailed continuously identifying, classifying and coding relevant data (Bowler, 2010). In particular, we focused on activists’ practices in (1) sharing information and spreading warning messages regarding REVA controls, (2) articulating and interpreting the REVA identity checks, as well as situating them within broader political issues and (3) organizing public contestations and events such as demonstrations, sign-ins of petitions, protest marches and other urban street actions. Kozinets (2010) explain that netnographic research on a community online plays primarily a supporting role. Thus apart from the interview material, the netnographic data were complemented with a review of articles in newspapers and other traditional media, as well as numerous official reports regarding the regulation of Sweden’s internal border controls and migration. To provide the analysis with a general context regarding the implementation of the REVA police project, we scrutinized official reports from the Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen), the Swedish National Police Board (Rikspolisstyrelsen), the Swedish Government Official Reports (Statens Offentliga Utredningar) and the Swedish Parliament (Riksdagen). It is important to note, however, that while we epistemologically took a critical stance to all research materials, regardless of their position in relation to REVA, we recognized the particular role of official documentation (as well as some media sources) in reproducing hegemonic discourse. While our purpose here is not to uncover that discourse, this perspective is taken into account. Following cf. Squire (2010), we oppose ‘objectivist’ and legalistic understandings of migration, borders and mobility.

The politics of internal border controls: situating the Swedish REVA project

Sweden is often portrayed as a country that emerged from the 2008 recession more favourably than most other European countries. However, despite relative financial stability, Sweden has gone through a radical transformation in its economic and migration policies, leading to increased structural inequality and a deep
crisis of the Swedish socio-economic model (Schierup et al., 2014). It has been argued that Sweden has shifted from an exceptionally positive brand of a liberal multicultural welfare state to a neoliberal experiment focusing on urban policing (of primarily immigrants), the corrosion of citizenship and the structuring of inequality in society (Schierup & Älund, 2011). These shifts were also made visible through the launch of the REVA project.

REVA is an acronym for a project entitled ‘Legal and effective enforcement of policy’ which was initiated in southern Sweden in 2008. REVA, which is financed by the European Return Fund, is a collaboration between three public authorities, namely the Swedish Border Police, the Swedish Prison and Probation Service and the Swedish Migration Board. The aim is to strengthen existing routines for identifying, securing and deporting so-called ‘undocumented immigrants’. By undocumented immigrants is meant individuals (1) who have already been denied asylum in Sweden but have remained in the country, (2) who have not yet applied for asylum and are therefore not registered or (3) who otherwise do not have documented permission to live in the country (for example, those who have returned after previously having been denied the right to stay).2 A core component of REVA is to carry out extensive, systematic identity checks of presumed or suspected undocumented immigrants at multiple sites within the country. In a report from 2010, the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen) notes that some studies indicate that the number of undocumented immigrants was broadly between 10,000 and 50,000 individuals in Sweden at that time. (Socialstyrelsen, 2010, p. 268). In late fall 2012, the REVA project was extended from southern Sweden to the greater Stockholm area, where identity checks began to be carried out by the Swedish border police and the Stockholm police at numerous urban sites, particularly metro stations and other transport hubs. As Schierup et al. (2014) note, as REVA was extended to Stockholm, it was criticized by activists ‘as a step towards the setting up of a “police state”’. Soon reports also emerged in the Swedish press that the identity checks were often not done in response to any observed unlawful actions on the part of those persons who were stopped, but rather solely on basis of their appearance.3 While the police argued that such appearance-based checks were primarily aimed at ‘gate crashers’ in the metro, accusations of racial or ethnic profiling,4 by which people of colour were disproportionately targeted, quickly lead to public outcry and extensive debate,5 as well as debates in parliament6 and highly publicized broader debates about racist tendencies in Sweden.7 REVA was criticized as being directed not only to undocumented immigrants, but also more generally at many Swedish citizens of colour (Schierup et al., 2014, p. 7).

Ethnic profiling when carrying out internal border controls is, however, forbidden by the legal instructions and guidelines for such controls, which may not be carried out ‘solely on the basis of a person having an appearance that is perceived as foreign or on the basis of his or her language or name’ (Rikspolisstyrelsens författningssamling, 2011, p. 5). Instead, public authorities are permitted to require identification only when a person is suspected of having violated Swedish law in the form of an infringement, violation or other illegal action. This principle and its implications were reiterated in the Swedish public debate concerning the discriminatory and illegal nature of the REVA practices, among else by Sweden’s Minister of Integration as well as numerous other public officials, commentators and activists in spring 2013 (Krupanski & Bobis, 2013). Voices in this debate contested not only the legitimacy of the identity checks themselves, but also related the police practices to a broad range of issues related to immigrant rights, immigration policies and rights to mobility in urban spaces.

The systematic use of ethnic profiling as a basis for police identity checks is not, however, a uniquely Swedish phenomenon. REVA can be situated within widespread similar discriminatory ‘stop and check’ practices that have been observed for a number of years in many European countries.8 Many of these practices have consisted of unprovoked, appearance-based identity checks that have taken place specifically at urban
transport hubs such as metro stations. As Weber and Bowling point out (2011, p. 354), it appears that globally the task of such policing is ‘increasingly to select, immobilize and eject suspect populations, not just from public spaces or localities, but increasingly from national territory’. As an initiative for making appearance-based identity checks, REVA can also be situated within Swedish and EU immigration politics and policies. Among other things, these policies focus on pro-moting, designing and implementing systematic so-called ‘internal controls’ at multiple sites within EU member states. Internal controls through identity checks and other measures have been an integral part of the Schengen Agreement since its inception in 1985 (Sweden signed the Agreement in 2001). Aimed at identifying unwanted or undocumented immigrants, these controls are described in the Swedish legal framework as a ‘compensatory measure’ for the relaxing of national border controls within the EU (Rikspolisstyrelsens författningssamling, 2011, p. 4). The EU regulatory framework also insures, however, non-discrimination of non-EU nationals on the basis of e.g. ethnic origin, religion, disability or sexual orientation, as specified in such binding documents as the Schengen Borders Code, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Schengen Handbook. For example, article 6 of the Schengen Borders Code specifically stipulates that states must respect non-discrimination on the basis ‘of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation’ (cited in Carrera & Hernanz, 2015, p. 5). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the central roles played by the police in Schengen border control practices reflect an underlying presumption that the movement of citizens from non-EU states is ‘a suspicious activity linked with criminality’ (Carrera & Hernanz, 2015, p. 5). In addition to the Schengen agreement, the legal justification that forms the backdrop to the recent REVA practices are two laws, namely the Border Control Law (‘gränskontrollslagen’, see Statens offent-liga utredningar, 2004) from 2004 and the Foreign Citizen Law (‘utlänningslagen’) from 2005 (Jerlerup, 2013). Among other things, it is specified that internal border controls can only be carried out if there is reason to believe that a person lacks the legal right be in the country or if there is another specific reason for an identity check. Such identity checks may be performed not only by police but also by multiple groups of actors such as immigration officers, security personnel and probation officers. They are to be carried out at numerous sites that may include public areas (e.g. streets, parks, squares, transport hubs), public gatherings (e.g. demonstrations, street festivals) and other areas where undocumented immigrants might be present (e.g. hospitals, clinics or private gatherings).

The launch of REVA police controls was much criticized in the media and this led to an intense debate (which goes beyond the scope of this paper), as well as a hybrid form of activism both offline and online. Political organizations such as Asylum Group, Action against Deportation, the Red Cross and No Border are examples of civil society actors that participated in this multifaceted resistance movement, which resulted in extensive protests (Barker, 2015; Lundberg & Strange, 2017). The activists involved in REVA resistance constitute a mosaic of different existing ideological, political and activist backgrounds united under an antiracist umbrella. While the anti-REVA campaign was a phenomenon that was limited in time, it contributed significantly to a national debate regarding surveillance of undocumented migrants and led to changes on the part of policing practice (such as racial profiling). Resistance to REVA took place in a period that was characterized by the rise of ultra-right extremism both in parliamentary terms (in the 2014 elections the nationalist Swedish Democrats became the third largest party in the parliament) and the streets in Sweden (significant attacks by far-right groups against events and groups in support of anti-racism, including attacks by a new Nazi movement). At the same time, the official Swedish state applied a so-called horseshoe theory by equalizing anti-racist groups, Islamic and far-right extremism in official reports (Fekete, 2014). Activists’ practices in resisting REVA can thus be situated within the context of broader political tensions and forms of activism specifically tied to issues of racism/anti-racism in Sweden at the time. We will now turn to a discussion of activists’ digital practices in resisting REVA identity checks in the Stockholm area.
Mobilizing resistance to REVA: activist configurations of social media

A core part of activists’ cyber-material practices was to configure and use social media as virtual platforms for articulating, mobilizing and organizing resistance to the REVA identity checks, particularly at metro systems. These virtual platforms included both open virtual platforms that were publicly accessible and closed virtual platforms with restricted access.\textsuperscript{10}

Some open virtual platforms were sites that pre-existed the REVA activism and were part of broader social justice movements for anti-racism, immigrant rights, and opposition to migration policies and controls in Sweden and Europe. Other open virtual platforms emerged specifically in response to the REVA identity checks and were integral to the constituting of new hybrid networks and a new movement in resistance to the police practices. These virtual platforms were thus co-constituted with the emergent activist movement. They included the following:

- Facebook sites e.g. ‘Reva Spotter stop the metro police’, as well as sites that used subway routes as an organizing principle for mobilizing specific groups of travellers. These included ‘Red Metro Line against REVA – stop hunting undocumented immigrants’, ‘Green Metro Line against REVA’ and ‘Blue Line against REVA’. The virtual configuration of these sites was thus tightly aligned with the material configuration of the metro system itself.
- Twitter accounts and hashtags e.g. @REVASpotter, #REVA, #REVAspotter, and #REVAjouren.
- Instagram images that were posted and spread on the above sites

These virtual platforms were used as Temporary Autonomous Zones enabling performance of political opposition to the REVA identity checks. First, they were used as sites to share information and contribute to increasing awareness of, and engagement in, the specific issue of REVA identity checks among (certain) groups of metro travellers, as well as among the public. The platforms became sites for on-going exchange of news, debates and events through the posting of e.g. critical media reports, Parliamentary debates, public seminars, political manifestos, interventions on the part of various experts and other material. They could also include short videos of actual police actions or eyewitness accounts of identity checks in metro stations.

Second, the virtual platforms provided open spaces for activists and others to articulate and interpret the REVA identity checks by situating them within broader political issues that were viewed as being at stake. For example, activists on the ‘REVA Spotter Stoppa Tbanepolisen’ Facebook site situated these issues in the context of European and Swedish migration policies and controls, linking them to e.g. the EU-wide police operation ‘Mos Maiorum’ against refugees and migrants,\textsuperscript{11} anti-racist campaigns such as ‘Stop racism now!’,\textsuperscript{12} and related movements. Similarly to practices in movements such as Occupy Wall Street and the Indignados in southern Europe, the platforms became forums for counter-politics by providing an open space for contesting practices that were regarded as infringements of human rights. Activists articulated their concerns and outrage about the (il)legitimacy of these practices as they sought to enrol other actors (both human and nonhuman) in various forms of organized opposition against the REVA practices.

Third, the open virtual platforms were used interactively by activists to publicize and organize public contestations and events such as demonstrations, sign-ins of petitions, protest marches and other urban street actions. Many of these events were local, carried out at entrances to metro stations or along specific metro routes from central city to the suburbs. The explicitly interactive and co-constitutive role of the cyber platforms in enacting various activities was clearly expressed in the form of on-going, online dialogues about the preparing of specific events (e.g. ‘is the flyer for Saturday’s march finished?’ followed by ‘yes, almost ready’), requests for eyewitness accounts (e.g. ‘Please report here if you have witnessed police checks’) and
concrete ideas for how others could express their opposition to REVA (e.g. ‘Here are eight ideas about what you can do’). This is a concrete example of how cyber practices can be translated into material/urban actions.

Fourth, some of the Facebook and Twitter sites also posted various kinds of supportive ‘what-to-do’ legal advice in the event that a person was actually subjected to identity checks. For example, these platforms advised that the person should request that the police officer specify the legal statute that gave her/him the right to conduct such identity checks, and if possible, file a formal complaint to the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman. One such platform that was specifically designed to provide legal counselling to travellers who had been subjected to identity checks was the Twitter site ‘REVA on duty’ (#REVAjouren). According to information posted on the site, REVA on duty was initiated by a network of lawyers, other legal experts and human rights activists who shared an interest in contesting the legality of the REVA identity checks. The ‘REVA on duty’ virtual platforms thus had a somewhat different focus than the other platforms, embodying attempts by activists to assume roles as legal advocates for both undocumented immigrants and others who were at risk of being subjected to identity checks.

Finally, one of the most striking ways in which activists utilized open platforms was the use of virtual tools to configure and spread real-time warning systems about the specific whereabouts of police controls as a means to alert travellers about where police were conducting REVA identity checks at a particular time of day or night. Virtual platforms that were specifically configured and used for this purpose included the Facebook site ‘Reva Spotter stop the metro police’ and the Twitter site #Revaspotter. The Facebook site self-describes its focus and activities as follows:

- Report about the location and time for the police ID check and help to save people from persecution.
- [We are ] (a) tool, a manifesto, a network, and a peaceful resistance against a police method that is a result of the REVA project...Even if the police leave the public transport system, the police patrols still have their shameful task of persecuting and restraining undocumented migrants. Through joint efforts we try to facilitate for the public to intervene and challenge [these practices], as well as to warn about these controls. (REVA Spotter Stoppa T-banepolisen, author translation)

Specifically, the Facebook and Twitter spotter platforms provided a mechanism for activists with smartphones to send SMS text messages in real time to notify other travellers about the presence and exact location of police patrols, identity checks or metro ticket controls at specific sites in and around the Stockholm metro. These messages – which typically focused on reporting on-going police presence at metro entrances, on platforms or on wagons of the metro train – were thus intended to warn those who were at risk of being targets of identity checks. Besides undocumented immigrants, these intended persons could also include broad groups of travellers (especially ‘travellers who looked foreign’) who risked being subjected to identity checks solely on the basis of their appearance. Text messages were customarily very short:

- 10.32 am Police are stationed at Old Haymarket metro station, entrance towards Kungsgatan
- Ticket controls on the Norsborg metro line that is passing Aspudden right now. 2:30 pm.
- 11.45 pm. Police are doing identity checks at Stockholm central station, the King’s street exit.

The idea behind these real-time warning systems was that travellers at risk of being stopped for identity checks, as well as other travellers who wanted to avoid any encounters with the police, could avoid these checks by adjusting their travel routes accordingly. When certain stations in the metro became ‘unsafe’, passengers could choose alternative routes. In contesting bordering practices, activists seamlessly bridged the material (e.g. metro stations, police controls, travellers) and the cyber (e.g. virtual platforms, real-time warning systems) in new cyber-material alliances.
As tools that activists could use to warn other travellers, the spotter platforms thus sought to provide undocumented immigrants with digital information that could enable them to circumvent attempts by police to exert control over their freedom of movement in the urban arena. The purpose was to create TAZs that provided alternative spaces for mobility in the Stockholm metro systems. Consistent with Bey (2011), these TAZs can be seen as an activist tactic in a space in which the police were omnipresent and all-powerful, yet simultaneously riddled with cracks and vacancies. The cyber platforms became hybrid alliances or entanglements of smart phones, SMS texts, Facebook sites, travellers’ bodies, subway entranceways and trains and patrolling police. These entanglements served as a virtual underground of materiality, flows, ideologies and alternative travel routes.

Notably, the online postings and exchanges on the various virtual platforms included relatively little self-reflection on the issue of whether or not those individuals who were at risk of being subjected to REVA identity checks had actual access to, and active practice in using, these platforms in their mobile phones. On the one hand, it is reasonable to ask whether all travellers in the main targeted group of undocumented immigrants could be expected to have smart phones that would have enabled them to access these platforms. On the other hand, it is problematic to assume that travellers within this heterogeneous group – or other travellers with ‘foreign appearance’ – would not have such access. Although the sites contained eyewitness accounts from travellers who reportedly observed such police practices, none of the postings on the platforms that are discussed in this paper reported any direct responses or reflections explicitly from travellers who self-identified as undocumented immigrants.

**Activists’ reflections – social media, interventions, politics**

This far into our text, the activists themselves – their backgrounds, activities and reflections – have been largely invisible. How did activists situate the REVA identity checks in relation to broader political issues, and how did they interpret and give meanings to their own interventions? How did activists view or problematize the significance of the various virtual platforms in constituting resistance? In this section, we will discuss these issues by drawing upon on-line interviews with three activists whom we will call Martin, Maria and Anna.

**Martin (representative of instrumental social movements)**

Martin was born and raised in Sweden and holds a Swedish university degree. He leads a non-profit, primarily volunteer-based organization that works to promote diversity and anti-racism in Sweden by organizing activities, meeting places and various kinds of support activities (such as school-related support) for children, youth and young adults. The organization focuses particularly on ‘newly-arrived youth’ including those who apply for political asylum in Sweden. Through this work Martin has been engaged in issues related to asylum and immigration for several years, and he reports that he has numerous friends who are currently seeking political asylum. His engagement in resistance to REVA consisted primarily of participating in demonstrations and debates on virtual platforms; he also attempted to crowd-fund a telephone app (‘REVAalert’, similar to #Revaspotter) for enabling activists to send real-time warnings about police presence.

Martin situates the Swedish REVA ID-checks within discriminatory EU and Swedish asylum politics:

(REVA) is part of attempt to ‘wall in’ Europe in a safe cocoon which immigrants cannot enter ... REVA is a natural continuation of the asylum politics that are already carried out in EU, but the effects of REVA are much easier to see and become indignant over because it’s happening on our streets and with our friends.
I think that REVA has made Sweden’s and EU’s inhumane asylum politics concrete in a way that makes it clear for many (people) how brutal and inhuman these politics are. It has also lifted up the racist undertones of these politics to a level where even those who are not very knowledgeable on the issues can see these structures, which I think mobilizes many new people. That’s why I think that resistance against REVA has an important role in mobilizing many people who have not previously been engaged in asylum issues and making them see that it’s actually about people and individuals’ lives.

Martin notes the irony that urban spaces in and around public transport, which is intended to enable mobility among broad groups, are utilized by police as sites for exerting controls with the aim of limiting the mobility of specific targeted travellers. At the same time, the fact that the REVA ID-checks take place in public spaces provides new possibilities for the public to react and document these practices: ‘we can film, get in the way, and help out when we see what is happening’.

For Martin, the activists’ use of virtual platforms, particularly the real-time warnings of police presence, is a new form of ‘pacifist resistance’ to REVA. In contrast to demonstrations and other street events, these platforms enable a movement to be continually accessible ‘around the clock’ as a resource for those activists who are not able to be physically present at sites of specific events. The Internet becomes an all-encompassing platform where activists can continually contribute with their vigilance. At the same time, Martin warns against an exaggerated and uncritical view of the role of social media in building and sustaining social movements:

(0)ne shouldn’t think that virtual resistance on the net builds itself – such resistance still requires time, commitment and creativity from a large number of people in order to work. There’s also a risk that there will be too many small initiatives, none of which have any real impact ... For example, if not enough people used (the real-time alert routines), the initiative would lose its value.

Martin is thus wary of relying too much on virtual platforms, also suggesting that too many net-based initiatives can have a fragmentary effect in situations in which impact can only be achieved if many activists respond to a specific initiative. He points to the work (Strauss and Star 1999) of building virtual resistance and the fact that such resistance is embedded in broader long-term activist commitments and practices.

Maria (representative of countercultural social movements)

Maria describes her background as follows:

My family was an example of ‘wandering refugees.’ They came to Sweden by walking over deserts, jungle. (And) water, wide landscapes and horses as our means of travel. They hid by night to avoid execution, while the days were used for all kinds of things, mostly to flee. Some years later I was born ... For me, it was natural to take the step to political engagement. It was not without pain and is not without pain even today.

Maria is engaged in many networks, organizations and social movements concerning political issues such as access to housing, LGBTQ-issues and social welfare rights. These engagements have entailed participation in concrete political interventions in the form of blockades, occupy-ing events and other actions.

Similarly to Martin, Maria situates the REVA identity checks in the context of discriminatory practices and abuse of power by Swedish authorities in ways that can ‘undermine respect for democracy’ in Sweden in a long-term perspective. For undocumented immigrants, Maria delineates a number of potentially devastating implications of such practices:

- Undocumented immigrants are shut off from basic human, democratic and union organizing rights;
Public areas in urban spaces get even more walls around them through which marginalized and vulnerable groups are refused access to the city;

Rights to health care, schooling and work are undermined in the long run;

The ID-checks lead to an increased rate of deportation of undocumented immigrants, which generates blood money and a more inhumane asylum politics.

To support these claims, Maria provides extensive links to media reports, public debates and organizational home pages that contain specific discussions of these and other issues.

Maria notes that metro systems have always been sites of police actions, but that these actions are interpreted differently depending on the cultures in which they are embedded. Like Martin, she recognizes that virtual platforms offer crucial spaces for enacting resistance, while at the same time she also advises caution against emphasizing their importance:

I am a little sceptical to the perspective that technologies give a power advantage and undermine power structures. It depends on how one uses the technology and in what context and for what purposes.

For the symbolic struggle, virtual platforms and related technologies are probably relatively important .... To see that a struggle is ‘reachable’ via virtual platforms is to render it visible and give existence to the .... struggle, which is then normalized and legitimized through this attention.

Maria also reflects on potential dangers of virtual platforms for social movements:

But ... (W)hat I have experienced at times is situations in which people have come together and tried to carry out the practical struggle after having gotten both their analysis and their goals constructed through virtual platforms. Of course, we all have been influenced by what others think and struggle for. But when we lose our own analysis and movement, and try to adjust ourselves to something that can’t be applied in our own social surroundings – well, then we stop being thinking beings. That’s why there have been problems among these people and the question was why their analysis and goals did not make it in Sweden. The answer was, and is, that they did not have a correct analysis and goal.

Here, Maria thus warns of the potential problems that can ensue when activists rely uncritically on analyses that have been formulated in virtual platforms. She notes that in order for political positions on a general level to be viable, it is also essential that activists translate such analyses to local contexts and circumstances.

Anna (representative of subcultural social movements)

Anna was born in Sweden and has a background in social movements related to human rights, social justice and distributional politics in which asylum issues have been present but relatively peripheral. She describes her engagement:

When the REVA actions started, it became difficult for me to defend to myself that I did not place Swedish migration politics and the life conditions of immigrants without papers at the top of my own priority list.

... 

I think that it is up to all of us to create the society that we want to live in. As things are now, I experience that Swedish authorities violate the human rights of immigrants without papers, carry out legally unsound asylum processes and through their actions contribute to a polarized and uncertain social climate. My privileges as a Swedish born, Swedish citizen in an economically sustainable situation, with access to higher education, makes it possible for me to move in
many contexts where I can try to influence the political development. For me, to not utilize these opportunities and try to open up these arenas for others would feel like I have given up my ideals.

In Anna’s view, the REVA actions embody ‘even more’ pressure that is exerted on a group that is already extremely vulnerable, namely immigrants without papers, by limiting the small freedom of movement that is available to this group. By intensifying the internal border controls in ‘shared public space’, REVA also works to stigmatize and criminalize immigrants without papers and asylum seekers. Anna sees clear advantages to utilizing social media in constituting and enacting resistance to REVA:

What social media enable in ways that earlier coordinating mechanisms such as telephone chains, fanzines and postering didn’t achieve to the same extent is partly speed and efficiency, partly a more open conversational arena where people can engage on a level that they are comfortable with. Information can be spread quickly to a lot of people and it is perhaps also easier for those without previous experience of activism to gradually become more engaged by for example, sharing links with their friends, signing protest lists and ‘liking’ certain postings.

At the same time, she does not think that access to virtual technologies provides activists with power that that might otherwise not have:

I wouldn’t like to refer to our use of technical aids as giving us an ‘power advantage’ in the current situation. There is a danger in relying on vulnerable communication tools – which can also make people more passive ...

At the same time, we need to have a certain risk awareness that sharing sensitive information in open networks is unnecessary.

The function of the warning systems has in practice mostly been to put pressure on the police who are exerting these controls and the actors with whom they cooperate, for example the Stockholm public transit authority. The real-time virtual warnings have also served to mobilize people, many have become engaged and indignant over the intensive search for immigrants without papers.

Significantly, Anna also points out that not all of the presumptive recipients of the real-time warnings can be expected to have access to the technologies in which the updates are embedded. She also notes that excess use of real-time warnings could also have been exclusionary in another way. Specifically, some travellers became reluctant or afraid to use the metro system as a means to access core activities and resources in their everyday lives:

I think that there has been a lack of awareness about the limited resources of immigrants without papers, not all of them can afford a smartphone with such app-capacity, there are enormous risks of using Facebook as hidden because this site ‘geotags’ and makes its users easy to trace.

Also, for a while there was certain inflation in all the warnings, all police and even a lot of the security guards with similar uniforms were reported. This scared some people who totally avoided the metro system, which meant that it became more difficult for them to get to work, health care, or school, as well as to food kitchens and organizations who provide legal advice.

Anna thus opens the black box of ‘immigrants without papers’ by noting the possibility of differences in access to smart technologies within this heterogeneous group and the exclusionary implications of such differences. She also notes that excessive warning has also had negative consequences for some individuals’ mobility.
Activists’ reflections – summing up

All of the interviewed activists situate their engagement in resistance to REVA within the context of their pre-existing, long-term political engagements in asylum issues, human rights movements and other movements related to social justice. The REVA police actions are viewed as expressions of discriminatory, inhumane Swedish and European migration politics specifically in relation to asylum seekers and undocumented immigrants. By targeting these groups in public spaces, particularly in public transport systems, the REVA ID checks are seen as violating everyday mobility and access to core societal functions among groups that are already highly vulnerable. Although the three activists were chosen because they represented different logics of resistance (that is, instrumental, countercul-tural and subcultural), we did not discern significant differences in their interpretations and practices. This finding is, however, in line with Kriesi’s et al. (1995, p. 85) observation that ‘one and the same movement may shift from one type to the other, at least as a general tendency’.

The three activists explicitly point out that the work of resisting the REVA practices calls for a combination of sustained commitments, multiple activities and strategies, and the use of both virtual and non-virtual tools. Cyber-material resistance (agency) to REVA’s bordering practices centred on the configuring and broad use of ‘real-time’ social media as a means of enabling undisturbed mobility for undocumented immigrants. While virtual platforms are fruitful for increasing the visibility of the issues and reaching many potential users, the activists note that sensitive information can also be used by those authorities whom the platforms are designed to obstruct. In addition, each activist was critical of an over-reliance of virtual platforms, instead noting risks in the form of fragmentation, the spreading of general political formulations without consideration of local contingencies and technology-mediated vulnerability. Only one of the activists, however, specifically pointed to the potentially exclusionary nature of the virtual warning systems, noting that it cannot be assumed that all of the main intended users would have universal access to the smartphones that enable use of the warning systems.

The interviews also underscore that resistance to REVA, as a contemporary bordering practice, entailed a process of searching for unregulated cyber-material alternatives (i.e. TAZ) within a heavily technologized and surveyed environment. This process included configuring emergent hybridity of human and nonhuman others, infrastructures in the urban environment, and digital practices. The interviews showed the ways in which political dissidence and resistance to REVA involved complex and symmetrical relations, negotiations, interactions and risks (e.g. in the form of over-reliance of virtual platforms, traceability). However, these intertwinnings were not merely hybrids of humans and nonhumans (as in actor-network theory). Rather, agentic resistance here constituted TAZs as a condition of possibility or mobility, if you like, of ‘humans’ and ‘non-humans’, not just as ideational concepts, but also in their cyber-materiality (cf. Barad, 2003). ANT’s agnosticism is made irrelevant here. Cyber-material resistance in the form of TAZ was also political agency that specifically aimed at undermining bordering practices (here REVA) of the Swedish state.

Conclusions

We suggest that the implications of our study for capturing the role of hybrid alliances in constituting politics and creating new temporary autonomous zones can be summarized as follows. First, it is clear that the various forms of social media were not just ‘used’ by activists; neither did activists merely ‘react’ to changes in digital technologies. The activists who were interviewed in our study were also careful not to
overemphasize the importance of the ‘technologies in themselves’; instead they viewed the virtual platforms as embedded in multiple strategies and enduring long-term activist practices. Consistent with work on users as active agents in re-constituting technologies,14 as well as work in social media that has discussed the ways in which activists modify technologies for their own pur- poses (e.g. Coleman & Golub, 2008), activists against REVA actively configured and reconfigured new virtual platforms. These platforms became hybrids of cyber/material, human/nonhuman entities and urban space/virtual space. Similarly to Hands (2011) argument about the potential of social media in shaping dissent and rebellion, we argue that work on social media and activism should focus on methodologically and conceptually understanding cyber-material alliances and their role in consti- tuting politics of resistance.

Second, these cyber-material alliances – between e.g. activists, computers, the Internet, transmit- ters and receptors of information, social media, metro stations, and mobile phones – did not only occur in the realm of previously constituted political activism. Consistent with previous work in STS (Callon, 1986; Latour, 1987), the self-organized assemblies of humans and nonhumans contributed to the making of activism. Papadopoulos argues (2011, p. 192) that the crucial moment for such con- stituent politics is the making of new actors or entities before negotiations about inclusion in existing institutions, expert committees or assemblies are possible. In our case, activists’ work in constituting resistance to REVA took place before any formal discussions in the Swedish Parliament, any negotia- tions among elected officials or representatives for established institutions within the police or immi- gration authorities, or any challenges in courts of law. Activists’ practices were instrumental, however, in making visible the broader political issues at stake by creating public forums for the articulation and framing these issues. These practices generated considerable public debate about the legitimacy of the project, which ultimately resulted in a formal parliamentary debate and a public declaration by authorities that the REVA practices in the Stockholm subway were to be discontinued. In other words, the constituent politics in this case contributed to redrawing the material conditions at stake ‘in close cooperation with non-human others’ in a way that forced the constituted order to ‘rearrange itself’ (Papadopoulos, 2011, p. 194).

Third, and consequently, we argue that the case of political resistance to the Swedish REVA project thus shows the ways in which activists contested urban bordering practices. REVA can be understood as an attempt by the state to carry out border controls as a means to protect its territory from undesired subjects, in this case, immigrants without papers. Activists specifically situated their interventions in the context of what was viewed as discriminatory border practices and immigration politics in Sweden. While REVA enacted illegality for undocumented immigrants, activists carried out a politics of enacting resistance/dissidence (cf. Galis & Lee, 2014) to these bordering practices. They sought to create alternative and more secure mobility paths for undocumented immigrants – that is, temporary autonomous zones, TAZ – that were intended to contest and circumvent REVA practices.

Finally, following Bey (2011), we argue that resistance to the REVA project thus shows the ways in which the configuring of cyber-material alliances enabled activists to create TAZ. These TAZ were expressed both in the form of virtual spaces (specifically, the virtual platforms that formed an ‘under-ground virtual infrastructure’) and alternative urban spaces (specifically, the proposed alternative routes in the metro system). We argue that by restoring possibilities for mobility and flows in urban space, the activists’ configuring of TAZ thus sought to provide cyber-material autonomy to undoc-umented immigrants and other travellers in the urban metro. We suggest that this cyber-material autonomy and its role in constituting political resistance reaffirms the importance of simultaneously capturing both virtual and spatial dimensions in contemporary activism.
In closing, we maintain that the approaches that we propose for understanding the role of cyber-material autonomy and TAZ in the context of contemporary resistance are not mere descriptive and objective tools of an abstract issue in a sociopolitical vacuum. We choose to pay attention to otherness and to become epistemological troublemakers. This does not mean that our take constitutes an avant-garde representation of activists’ or immigrants’ interests; instead, following Haraway (2001), we seek ‘shared conversations’ with the activists we have interviewed and studied.

Notes

1. This approach implies that the researcher does not interpret an observation but directly copies a citation or a pictorial post from a site (see Kozinets, 2010).

2. In addition, children who are born in Sweden to immigrant parents without papers are also considered to be undocumented immigrants, see Socialstyrelsen, 2010, p. 270.


4. The Open Society Institute defines ethnic profiling as ‘the use by the police, security, immigration or customs officials of generalisations based on race, ethnicity, religion or national origin rather than individual behaviour or objective evidence – as the basis for suspicion in directing discretionary law enforcement actions. It can also include situations where law enforcement policies and practices, although not themselves defined either wholly or in part by reference to ethnicity, race, national origin or religion, nevertheless do have a disproportionate impact on such groups within the population and where this cannot otherwise be justified in terms of legitimate law enforcement objectives and outcomes’. Open Society Justice Initiative, 2009b, p. 3).

5. See, for example, Sveriges television (2013, March 6); Sveriges television (2013, March 1); Dagens Nyheter, 2013b, 2013bc; Feministiskt perspektiv, 2013; Sveriges television (2013, March 5); Metro, 2013.

6. See http://www.riksdagen.se/sv/Debatter--beslut/Ovriga-debatter/Aktuella-debatter/Aktuell-debatt/?did=H0C 120130419ad

7. One such debate focused on an widely cited exchange between a well-known Swedish writer and the Minister of Justice, which was extensively spread on social media, see http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/basta-beatrice-ask/ and http://www.dn.se/kultur-noje/beatrice-ask-en-tankvard-och-viktig-artikel/

8. These countries include France (Birchall, 2015; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2009a; Whembolua, Conserve, & Gott, 2014), Great Britain (Delsol & Wissow, 2014; Hollo & Neild, 2013), the Netherlands (Eijkman, 2010; van der Leun & van der Woude, 2011), Spain (Hollo & Neild, 2013; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2009b), the United States (Goris, 2012; Miller et al., 2008) and numerous other countries (Miller et al., 2008; Open Society Foundations, 2005; Open Society Justice Initiative, 2009b). For more extensive information on expressions of ethnic profiling, as well as resource materials for reducing such profiling, see www.opensocietyfoundations.org.

9. For a fuller discussion and full references, see Carrera & Hernanz, 2015.

10. This paper will not include a discussion of the closed virtual platforms.


13. The task of this ombudsman is to assure that public authorities comply with Swedish law and other statutes governing their actions.

14. See, for example, Akrich, 1992; Oudshoorn & Pinch, 2003.

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