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When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless

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When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless. / Bakos, Yannis; Halaburda, Hanna; Mueller-Bloch, Christoph.

In: Communications of the ACM , Vol. 64, No. 2, 2021, p. 20-22.

Research output: Journal Article or Conference Article in JournalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

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@article{e29df7d1e93943d39f38b97d983e730d,
title = "When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless",
abstract = "Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems are frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They are hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the world by creating a technological imperative favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. We argue that such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain circumstances, are generally exaggerated and often misguided. They illustrate a penchant to associate open access with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that while possible is far from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put on the blockchain” in order to avoid centralized control, permissioned governance may offer a more decentralized and more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers in practice.",
author = "Yannis Bakos and Hanna Halaburda and Christoph Mueller-Bloch",
year = "2021",
doi = "10.1145/3442371",
language = "English",
volume = "64",
pages = "20--22",
journal = "Communications of the A C M",
issn = "0001-0782",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
number = "2",

}

RIS

TY - JOUR

T1 - When Permissioned Blockchains Deliver More Decentralization Than Permissionless

AU - Bakos, Yannis

AU - Halaburda, Hanna

AU - Mueller-Bloch, Christoph

PY - 2021

Y1 - 2021

N2 - Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems are frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They are hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the world by creating a technological imperative favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. We argue that such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain circumstances, are generally exaggerated and often misguided. They illustrate a penchant to associate open access with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that while possible is far from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put on the blockchain” in order to avoid centralized control, permissioned governance may offer a more decentralized and more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers in practice.

AB - Permissionless blockchain systems inspired by Bitcoin and related crypto-ecosystems are frequently promoted as the enablers of an open, distributed, and decentralized ideal. They are hailed as a solution that can “democratize” the world by creating a technological imperative favoring open, distributed, and decentralized systems, platforms, and markets. We argue that such claims and expectations, while they may be fulfilled under certain circumstances, are generally exaggerated and often misguided. They illustrate a penchant to associate open access with decentralized control in distributed architectures, an association that while possible is far from guaranteed. When enterprise, social and economic activities are “put on the blockchain” in order to avoid centralized control, permissioned governance may offer a more decentralized and more predictable outcome than open permissionless governance offers in practice.

U2 - 10.1145/3442371

DO - 10.1145/3442371

M3 - Journal article

VL - 64

SP - 20

EP - 22

JO - Communications of the A C M

JF - Communications of the A C M

SN - 0001-0782

IS - 2

ER -

ID: 85484612