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How Could Snowden Attack an Election?

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapterArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

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How Could Snowden Attack an Election? / Wikström, Douglas; Barrat, Jordi; Heiberg, Sven; Krimmer, Robert; Schürmann, Carsten.

Electronic Voting: Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings. Bregenz/Lochau : Springer, 2017. p. 280-291 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 10615).

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapterArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Harvard

Wikström, D, Barrat, J, Heiberg, S, Krimmer, R & Schürmann, C 2017, How Could Snowden Attack an Election? in Electronic Voting: Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings. Springer, Bregenz/Lochau, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 10615, pp. 280-291. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17

APA

Wikström, D., Barrat, J., Heiberg, S., Krimmer, R., & Schürmann, C. (2017). How Could Snowden Attack an Election? In Electronic Voting: Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings (pp. 280-291). Springer. Lecture Notes in Computer Science Vol. 10615 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17

Vancouver

Wikström D, Barrat J, Heiberg S, Krimmer R, Schürmann C. How Could Snowden Attack an Election? In Electronic Voting: Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings. Bregenz/Lochau: Springer. 2017. p. 280-291. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 10615). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17

Author

Wikström, Douglas ; Barrat, Jordi ; Heiberg, Sven ; Krimmer, Robert ; Schürmann, Carsten. / How Could Snowden Attack an Election?. Electronic Voting: Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings. Bregenz/Lochau : Springer, 2017. pp. 280-291 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 10615).

Bibtex

@inproceedings{ce82b52e484e4c02a62e3fc0dc99312c,
title = "How Could Snowden Attack an Election?",
abstract = "We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary{\textquoteright}s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.",
author = "Douglas Wikstr{\"o}m and Jordi Barrat and Sven Heiberg and Robert Krimmer and Carsten Sch{\"u}rmann",
year = "2017",
month = oct,
day = "24",
doi = "10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17",
language = "English",
isbn = "978-3-319-68686-8",
series = "Lecture Notes in Computer Science",
publisher = "Springer",
pages = "280--291",
booktitle = "Electronic Voting",
address = "Germany",

}

RIS

TY - GEN

T1 - How Could Snowden Attack an Election?

AU - Wikström, Douglas

AU - Barrat, Jordi

AU - Heiberg, Sven

AU - Krimmer, Robert

AU - Schürmann, Carsten

PY - 2017/10/24

Y1 - 2017/10/24

N2 - We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.

AB - We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17

DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-68687-5_17

M3 - Article in proceedings

SN - 978-3-319-68686-8

T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

SP - 280

EP - 291

BT - Electronic Voting

PB - Springer

CY - Bregenz/Lochau

ER -

ID: 82951659