Computation of Stackelberg equilibria of finite sequential games

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  • Branislav Bosanski
  • Simina Branzei
  • Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
  • Peter Bro Miltersen
  • Troels Bjerre Lund

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The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Original languageEnglish
Article number23
JournalACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2017

ID: 83587057