Privacy-Preserving Verifiability: A Case for an Electronic Exam Protocol

Rosario Giustolisi, Vincenzo Iovino, Gabriele Lenzini

Publikation: Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitelKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

We introduce the notion of privacy-preserving verifiability for security protocols. It holds when a protocol admits a verifiability test that does not reveal, to the verifier that runs it, more pieces of information about the protocol’s execution than those required to run the test. Our definition of privacy-preserving verifiability is general and applies to cryptographic protocols as well as to human security protocols. In this paper we exemplify it in the domain of e-exams. We prove that the notion is meaningful by studying an existing exam protocol that is verifiable but whose verifiability tests are not privacy-preserving. We prove that the notion is applicable: we review the protocol using functional encryption so that it admits a verifiability test that preserves privacy according to our definition. We analyse, in ProVerif, that the verifiability holds despite malicious parties and that the new protocol maintains all the security properties of the original protocol, so proving that our privacy-preserving verifiability can be achieved starting from existing security
OriginalsprogEngelsk
Titel14th International Conference on Security and Cryptography (SECRYPT)
ForlagSCITEPRESS Digital Library
Publikationsdato2017
Sider139-150
ISBN (Trykt)978-989-758-259-2
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 2017

Fingeraftryk

Dyk ned i forskningsemnerne om 'Privacy-Preserving Verifiability: A Case for an Electronic Exam Protocol'. Sammen danner de et unikt fingeraftryk.

Citationsformater