How Could Snowden Attack an Election?

Douglas Wikström, Jordi Barrat, Sven Heiberg, Robert Krimmer, Carsten Schürmann

Publikation: Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitelKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelElectronic Voting : Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings
Antal sider11
UdgivelsesstedBregenz/Lochau
ForlagSpringer
Publikationsdato24 okt. 2017
Sider280-291
ISBN (Trykt)978-3-319-68686-8
ISBN (Elektronisk)978-3-319-68687-5
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 24 okt. 2017
NavnLecture Notes in Computer Science
Vol/bind10615
ISSN0302-9743

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