Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Branislav Bosanski, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Publikation: Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitelKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

Abstrakt

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
OriginalsprogEngelsk
TitelLNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics : 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings
RedaktørerEvangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
ForlagSpringer
Publikationsdato9 dec. 2015
Sider201-215
ISBN (Trykt)978-3-662-48994-9
ISBN (Elektronisk)978-3-662-48995-6
DOI
StatusUdgivet - 9 dec. 2015
BegivenhedWeb and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference - CWI, Amsterdam, Holland
Varighed: 9 dec. 201515 dec. 2015
http://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/

Konference

KonferenceWeb and Internet Economics
LokationCWI
Land/OmrådeHolland
ByAmsterdam
Periode09/12/201515/12/2015
Internetadresse
NavnLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN0302-9743

Fingeraftryk

Dyk ned i forskningsemnerne om 'Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games'. Sammen danner de et unikt fingeraftryk.

Citationsformater