The Complexity of Approximating a Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibrium of a Multi-player Game in Strategic Form

Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Research output: Journal Article or Conference Article in JournalJournal articleResearchpeer-review

Abstract

We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n >= 3. We show that this task is complete for the complexity class FIXP_a. In particular, the task is polynomial time equivalent to the task of computing an approximation of a Nash equilibrium in strategic form games with three (or more) players.
Original languageEnglish
Book seriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume8768
Pages (from-to)231-243
Number of pages12
ISSN0302-9743
Publication statusPublished - 2014

Keywords

  • trembling hand perfect equilibrium
  • n-player game
  • FIXP_a complexity
  • Nash equilibrium approximation
  • strategic form games

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