Secure Internet Exams Despite Coercion

Rosario Giustolisi

Secure Internet Exams Despite Coercion

Rosario Giustolisi

Center for Information Security and Trust

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We study coercion-resistance for online exams. We propose
two properties, Anonymous Submission and Single-Blindness which, if
hold, preserve the anonymity of the links between tests, test takers, and
examiners even when the parties coerce one another into revealing secrets. The properties are relevant: not even Remark!, a secure exam
protocol that satisfied anonymous marking and anonymous examiners
results to be coercion resistant. Then, we propose a coercion-resistance
protocol which satisfies, in addition to known anonymity properties, the
two novel properties we have introduced. We prove our claims formally
in ProVerif. The paper has also another contribution: it describes an
attack (and a fix) to an exponentiation mixnet that Remark! uses to
ensure unlinkability. We use the secure version of the mixnet in our new
protocol.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	17th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	2022
Publication status	Published - 2022
Event	International Workshop on Data Privacy Management - Copenhagen, Denmark Duration: 29 Sept 2022 → 30 Sept 2022

Conference

Conference	International Workshop on Data Privacy Management
Country/Territory	Denmark
City	Copenhagen
Period	29/09/2022 → 30/09/2022

Keywords

Coercion-resistance
Formal Verification
Exponentiation Mixnet
Security Flaws
Security Protocol Design
Proverif

Access to Document

https://arxiv.org/ftp/arxiv/papers/2207/2207.12796.pdf

Cite this

@inproceedings{5ea1a1421f334672b8adc87b7c5a7618,

title = "Secure Internet Exams Despite Coercion",

abstract = "We study coercion-resistance for online exams. We propose two properties, Anonymous Submission and Single-Blindness which, if hold, preserve the anonymity of the links between tests, test takers, and examiners even when the parties coerce one another into revealing secrets. The properties are relevant: not even Remark!, a secure exam protocol that satisfied anonymous marking and anonymous examiners results to be coercion resistant. Then, we propose a coercion-resistance protocol which satisfies, in addition to known anonymity properties, the two novel properties we have introduced. We prove our claims formally in ProVerif. The paper has also another contribution: it describes an attack (and a fix) to an exponentiation mixnet that Remark! uses to ensure unlinkability. We use the secure version of the mixnet in our new protocol.",

keywords = "Coercion-resistance, Formal Verification, Exponentiation Mixnet, Security Flaws, Security Protocol Design, Proverif, Coercion-resistance, Formal Verification, Exponentiation Mixnet, Security Flaws, Security Protocol Design, Proverif",

author = "Rosario Giustolisi",

year = "2022",

language = "English",

booktitle = "17th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management",

publisher = "Springer",

address = "Germany",

note = "International Workshop on Data Privacy Management, DPM ; Conference date: 29-09-2022 Through 30-09-2022",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Secure Internet Exams Despite Coercion

AU - Giustolisi, Rosario

PY - 2022

Y1 - 2022

N2 - We study coercion-resistance for online exams. We propose two properties, Anonymous Submission and Single-Blindness which, if hold, preserve the anonymity of the links between tests, test takers, and examiners even when the parties coerce one another into revealing secrets. The properties are relevant: not even Remark!, a secure exam protocol that satisfied anonymous marking and anonymous examiners results to be coercion resistant. Then, we propose a coercion-resistance protocol which satisfies, in addition to known anonymity properties, the two novel properties we have introduced. We prove our claims formally in ProVerif. The paper has also another contribution: it describes an attack (and a fix) to an exponentiation mixnet that Remark! uses to ensure unlinkability. We use the secure version of the mixnet in our new protocol.

AB - We study coercion-resistance for online exams. We propose two properties, Anonymous Submission and Single-Blindness which, if hold, preserve the anonymity of the links between tests, test takers, and examiners even when the parties coerce one another into revealing secrets. The properties are relevant: not even Remark!, a secure exam protocol that satisfied anonymous marking and anonymous examiners results to be coercion resistant. Then, we propose a coercion-resistance protocol which satisfies, in addition to known anonymity properties, the two novel properties we have introduced. We prove our claims formally in ProVerif. The paper has also another contribution: it describes an attack (and a fix) to an exponentiation mixnet that Remark! uses to ensure unlinkability. We use the secure version of the mixnet in our new protocol.

KW - Coercion-resistance

KW - Formal Verification

KW - Exponentiation Mixnet

KW - Security Flaws

KW - Security Protocol Design

KW - Proverif

KW - Coercion-resistance

KW - Formal Verification

KW - Exponentiation Mixnet

KW - Security Flaws

KW - Security Protocol Design

KW - Proverif

M3 - Article in proceedings

BT - 17th DPM International Workshop on Data Privacy Management

PB - Springer

T2 - International Workshop on Data Privacy Management

Y2 - 29 September 2022 through 30 September 2022

ER -

Secure Internet Exams Despite Coercion

Abstract

Conference

Keywords

Access to Document

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Cite this