Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Fabrizio Biondi, Andrzej Wasowski, Axel Legay, Pasquale Malacaria

Research output: Journal Article or Conference Article in JournalConference articleResearchpeer-review


The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we
show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on
the Onion Routing protocol.
Original languageEnglish
Book seriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
Pages (from-to)68-87
Number of pages20
Publication statusPublished - 20 Jan 2013


  • Information leakage
  • Channel capacity
  • Markov chain
  • Markov Decision Process
  • Onion routing


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