Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Fabrizio Biondi; Andrzej Wasowski; Axel Legay; Pasquale Malacaria

Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Fabrizio Biondi, Andrzej Wasowski, Axel Legay, Pasquale Malacaria

Research output: Journal Article or Conference Article in Journal › Conference article › Research › peer-review

Abstract

The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, we
show how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks on
the Onion Routing protocol.

Original language	English
Book series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
Volume	7737
Pages (from-to)	68-87
Number of pages	20
ISSN	0302-9743
Publication status	Published - 20 Jan 2013

Keywords

Information leakage
Channel capacity
Markov chain
Markov Decision Process
Onion routing

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Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized ProtocolsAccepted author manuscript, 859 KB

MT-Lab - Modelling of Information Technology
Wasowski, A. (CoI), Godskesen, J. C. (PI), Song, L. (CoI), Traonouez, L.-M. (CoI) & Biondi, F. (CoI)
01/11/2008 → 31/10/2013
Project: Research

Cite this

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title = "Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols",

abstract = "The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, weshow how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks onthe Onion Routing protocol.",

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AU - Biondi, Fabrizio

AU - Wasowski, Andrzej

AU - Legay, Axel

AU - Malacaria, Pasquale

PY - 2013/1/20

Y1 - 2013/1/20

N2 - The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, weshow how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks onthe Onion Routing protocol.

AB - The quantification of information leakage provides a quantitative evaluation of the security of a system. We propose the usage of Markovian processes to model and analyze the information leakage of deterministic and probabilistic systems. We show that this method generalizes the lattice of information approach and is a natural framework for modeling refined attackers capable to observe the internal behavior of the system. We also use our method to obtain an algorithm for the computation of channel capacity from our Markovian models. Finally, weshow how to use the method to analyze timed and non-timed attacks onthe Onion Routing protocol.

KW - Information leakage

KW - Channel capacity

KW - Markov chain

KW - Markov Decision Process

KW - Onion routing

KW - Information leakage

KW - Channel capacity

KW - Markov chain

KW - Markov Decision Process

KW - Onion routing

M3 - Conference article

SN - 0302-9743

VL - 7737

SP - 68

EP - 87

JO - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

JF - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

ER -

Quantifying Information Leakage of Randomized Protocols

Abstract

Keywords

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Projects

MT-Lab - Modelling of Information Technology

Cite this