Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations

Frederik Haagensen; Søren Debois

doi:10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23

Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations

Frederik Haagensen
, Søren Debois

Center for Information Security and Trust

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

We present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing the incentive structure in formal models of inter-organizational businesses processes. In such processes, the choices of each participants influence the outcome of others. A potential participant may be torn between the prospect of a highly preferable outcome on the one hand (e.g., a bonus on timely delivery), and the possibility that another player may make a choice (e.g., reallocation of the fast trucks) which renders that outcome impossible to achieve. We propose (a) an analysis which given the preferences of participants determines if the collaboration is at all meaningful; (b) an algorithm for modifying the incentive structure of such a process using both fines and outcome re-distribution to increase the benefit for all participants; and (c) a practical way of computing this algorithm while concealing the preferences of the collaborators for each other using secure multi-party computation.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings
Editors	Claudio Di Ciccio Remco, Dijkman Adela del Río Ortega, Stefanie Rinderle-Ma
Number of pages	18
Volume	20
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	2022
Edition	1
Pages	343–360
ISBN (Print)	978-3-031-16102-5
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-031-16103-2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23
Publication status	Published - 2022
Event	Business Process Management - Münster, Germany Duration: 11 Sept 2022 → 16 Sept 2022 Conference number: 20th https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2

Conference

Conference	Business Process Management
Number	20th
Country/Territory	Germany
City	Münster
Period	11/09/2022 → 16/09/2022
Internet address	https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2

Series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN	0302-9743

Keywords

Game theory
Incentive design
Inter-organizational processes
Mechanism design
Secure multi-party computation

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23Licence: Unspecified

Cite this

Haagensen, F., & Debois, S. (2022). Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations. In C. D. C. Remco, D. Adela del Río Ortega, & S. Rinderle-Ma (Eds.), Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings (1 ed., Vol. 20, pp. 343–360). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23

Haagensen, Frederik ; Debois, Søren. / Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations. Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings. editor / Claudio Di Ciccio Remco ; Dijkman Adela del Río Ortega ; Stefanie Rinderle-Ma. Vol. 20 1. ed. Springer, 2022. pp. 343–360 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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abstract = "We present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing the incentive structure in formal models of inter-organizational businesses processes. In such processes, the choices of each participants influence the outcome of others. A potential participant may be torn between the prospect of a highly preferable outcome on the one hand (e.g., a bonus on timely delivery), and the possibility that another player may make a choice (e.g., reallocation of the fast trucks) which renders that outcome impossible to achieve. We propose (a) an analysis which given the preferences of participants determines if the collaboration is at all meaningful; (b) an algorithm for modifying the incentive structure of such a process using both fines and outcome re-distribution to increase the benefit for all participants; and (c) a practical way of computing this algorithm while concealing the preferences of the collaborators for each other using secure multi-party computation.",

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Haagensen, F & Debois, S 2022, Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations. in CDC Remco, D Adela del Río Ortega & S Rinderle-Ma (eds), Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings. 1 edn, vol. 20, Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 343–360, Business Process Management, Münster, Germany, 11/09/2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23

Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations. / Haagensen, Frederik; Debois, Søren.
Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings. ed. / Claudio Di Ciccio Remco; Dijkman Adela del Río Ortega; Stefanie Rinderle-Ma. Vol. 20 1. ed. Springer, 2022. p. 343–360 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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AU - Debois, Søren

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N2 - We present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing the incentive structure in formal models of inter-organizational businesses processes. In such processes, the choices of each participants influence the outcome of others. A potential participant may be torn between the prospect of a highly preferable outcome on the one hand (e.g., a bonus on timely delivery), and the possibility that another player may make a choice (e.g., reallocation of the fast trucks) which renders that outcome impossible to achieve. We propose (a) an analysis which given the preferences of participants determines if the collaboration is at all meaningful; (b) an algorithm for modifying the incentive structure of such a process using both fines and outcome re-distribution to increase the benefit for all participants; and (c) a practical way of computing this algorithm while concealing the preferences of the collaborators for each other using secure multi-party computation.

AB - We present a game-theoretic approach to analyzing the incentive structure in formal models of inter-organizational businesses processes. In such processes, the choices of each participants influence the outcome of others. A potential participant may be torn between the prospect of a highly preferable outcome on the one hand (e.g., a bonus on timely delivery), and the possibility that another player may make a choice (e.g., reallocation of the fast trucks) which renders that outcome impossible to achieve. We propose (a) an analysis which given the preferences of participants determines if the collaboration is at all meaningful; (b) an algorithm for modifying the incentive structure of such a process using both fines and outcome re-distribution to increase the benefit for all participants; and (c) a practical way of computing this algorithm while concealing the preferences of the collaborators for each other using secure multi-party computation.

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KW - Incentive design

KW - Inter-organizational processes

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Secure multi-party computation

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DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23

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T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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EP - 360

BT - Business Process Management

A2 - Remco, Claudio Di Ciccio

A2 - Adela del Río Ortega, Dijkman

A2 - Rinderle-Ma, Stefanie

PB - Springer

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ER -

Haagensen F, Debois S. Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations. In Remco CDC, Adela del Río Ortega D, Rinderle-Ma S, editors, Business Process Management : 20th International Conference, BPM 2022, Münster, Germany, September 11–16, 2022, Proceedings. 1 ed. Vol. 20. Springer. 2022. p. 343–360. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-031-16103-2_23

Incentive Alignment Through Secure Computations

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Conference

Keywords

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Cite this