How Could Snowden Attack an Election?

Douglas Wikström, Jordi Barrat, Sven Heiberg, Robert Krimmer, Carsten Schürmann

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapterArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review


We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationElectronic Voting : Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings
Number of pages11
Place of PublicationBregenz/Lochau
Publication date24 Oct 2017
ISBN (Print)978-3-319-68686-8
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-319-68687-5
Publication statusPublished - 24 Oct 2017
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science


  • voting systems
  • covert attack
  • election security
  • sensitive information disclosure
  • adversarial influence


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