Abstract
We study the computational complexity of proper equilibrium in finite games and prove the following results. First, for two-player games in strategic form we show that the task of simply verifying the proper equilibrium conditions of a given pure Nash equilibrium is NP-complete. Next, for n -player games in strategic form we show that the task of computing an approximation of a proper equilibrium is FIXPa-complete. Finally, for n -player polymatrix games we show that the task of computing a symbolic proper equilibrium is PPAD-complete.
| Original language | English |
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| Title of host publication | Proceedings of the 2018 ACM Conference on Economics and Computation : EC '18 |
| Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery |
| Publication date | 2018 |
| Pages | 113-130 |
| ISBN (Print) | 978-1-4503-5829-3 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
| Event | The nineteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC’18) - Cornell University, Ithaca, United States Duration: 18 Jun 2018 → 22 Jun 2018 Conference number: 19 http://www.sigecom.org/ec18/ |
Conference
| Conference | The nineteenth ACM conference on Economics and Computation (ACM EC’18) |
|---|---|
| Number | 19 |
| Location | Cornell University |
| Country/Territory | United States |
| City | Ithaca |
| Period | 18/06/2018 → 22/06/2018 |
| Internet address |
Keywords
- Computational Complexity
- Proper Equilibrium
- Finite Games
- NP-Complete
- PPAD-Complete