Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Branislav Bosanski; Simina Branzei; Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen; Peter Bro Miltersen; Troels Bjerre Sørensen

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Branislav Bosanski
, Simina Branzei
, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen
, Peter Bro Miltersen
, Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Algorithms

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

Original language	English
Title of host publication	LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics : 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings
Editors	Evangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
Publisher	Springer
Publication date	9 Dec 2015
Pages	201-215
ISBN (Print)	978-3-662-48994-9
ISBN (Electronic)	978-3-662-48995-6
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15
Publication status	Published - 9 Dec 2015
Event	Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference - CWI, Amsterdam, Netherlands Duration: 9 Dec 2015 → 15 Dec 2015 http://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/

Conference

Conference	Web and Internet Economics
Location	CWI
Country/Territory	Netherlands
City	Amsterdam
Period	09/12/2015 → 15/12/2015
Internet address	http://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/

Series	Lecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN	0302-9743

Keywords

Stackelberg equilibrium
Sequential games
Extensive-form games
Algorithm design
Game theory

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10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

1507.07677 Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential GamesAccepted author manuscript, 407 KB

https://arxiv.org/pdf/1507.07677.pdf

Cite this

Bosanski, B., Branzei, S., Hansen, K. A., Miltersen, P. B., & Sørensen, T. B. (2015). Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. In E. Markakis, & G. Schäfer (Eds.), LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings (pp. 201-215). Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

Bosanski, Branislav ; Branzei, Simina ; Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt et al. / Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings. editor / Evangelos Markakis ; Guido Schäfer. Springer, 2015. pp. 201-215 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

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title = "Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games",

abstract = "The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player\textasciitilde{}1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player\textasciitilde{}2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.",

keywords = "Stackelberg equilibrium, Sequential games, Extensive-form games, Algorithm design, Game theory, Stackelberg equilibrium, Sequential games, Extensive-form games, Algorithm design, Game theory",

author = "Branislav Bosanski and Simina Branzei and Hansen, \{Kristoffer Arnsfelt\} and Miltersen, \{Peter Bro\} and S{\o}rensen, \{Troels Bjerre\}",

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editor = "Evangelos Markakis and Guido Sch{\"a}fer",

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Bosanski, B, Branzei, S, Hansen, KA, Miltersen, PB & Sørensen, TB 2015, Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. in E Markakis & G Schäfer (eds), LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings. Springer, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pp. 201-215, Web and Internet Economics, Amsterdam, Netherlands, 09/12/2015. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. / Bosanski, Branislav; Branzei, Simina; Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt et al.
LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings. ed. / Evangelos Markakis; Guido Schäfer. Springer, 2015. p. 201-215 (Lecture Notes in Computer Science).

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapter › Article in proceedings › Research › peer-review

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AU - Sørensen, Troels Bjerre

PY - 2015/12/9

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AB - The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.

KW - Stackelberg equilibrium

KW - Sequential games

KW - Extensive-form games

KW - Algorithm design

KW - Game theory

KW - Stackelberg equilibrium

KW - Sequential games

KW - Extensive-form games

KW - Algorithm design

KW - Game theory

U2 - 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

DO - 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

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EP - 215

BT - LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics

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ER -

Bosanski B, Branzei S, Hansen KA, Miltersen PB, Sørensen TB. Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games. In Markakis E, Schäfer G, editors, LNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings. Springer. 2015. p. 201-215. (Lecture Notes in Computer Science). doi: 10.1007/978-3-662-48995-6_15

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

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Keywords

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