Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Branislav Bosanski, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Sørensen

Research output: Conference Article in Proceeding or Book/Report chapterArticle in proceedingsResearchpeer-review

Abstract

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player~1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player~2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader's choice. We study Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximate algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationLNCS 9470 - Web and Internet Economics : 11th International Conference, WINE 2015, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, December 9-12, 2015, Proceedings
EditorsEvangelos Markakis, Guido Schäfer
PublisherSpringer
Publication date9 Dec 2015
Pages201-215
ISBN (Print)978-3-662-48994-9
ISBN (Electronic)978-3-662-48995-6
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 9 Dec 2015
EventWeb and Internet Economics: 11th International Conference - CWI, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Duration: 9 Dec 201515 Dec 2015
http://event.cwi.nl/wine2015/

Conference

ConferenceWeb and Internet Economics
LocationCWI
Country/TerritoryNetherlands
CityAmsterdam
Period09/12/201515/12/2015
Internet address
SeriesLecture Notes in Computer Science
ISSN0302-9743

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