Sketch for a model of four epistemological positions toward computer game play

The paper attempts to sketch out four distinct epistemological positions toward the player, who is understood as derived from play and game. To map out the problem field, two equally challenged positions toward computer game play are observed, emerging from inadequate treatment of the differences between play and game. The analysis starts out by postulating two parallel but fundamentally different views regarding play; the subjectivist viewpoint, from which the essence of playing a game depends on the mental state of the playing subject, and, the non-subjectivist viewpoint, from which the essence of playing a game is seen as independent of what goes on in the player’s mind (actually, the player might not even be the true subject of the game). Similar polarities are postulated regarding a game; from an exclusive viewpoint .game. is a signifying shorthand for objects, which, when observed from an external viewpoint, appear as fulfilling a set criteria, while from an inclusive viewpoint, every object which affords being played is counted as a game. These polarities are combined on a two-dimensional plane in order to arrive at a four epistemological positions toward computer game play, which are then discussed in terms of what kind of insights they offer onto the player’s experience.