How Could Snowden Attack an Election?

Douglas Wikström, Jordi Barrat, Sven Heiberg, Robert Krimmer, Carsten Schürmann, Helger Lipmaa, Vanessa Teague

    Publikation: Konference artikel i Proceeding eller bog/rapport kapitelKonferencebidrag i proceedingsForskningpeer review

    Abstract

    We discuss a new type of attack on voting systems that in contrast to attacks described in the literature does not disrupt the expected behavior of the voting system itself. Instead the attack abuses the normal functionality to link the tallying of the election to disclosing sensitive information assumed to be held by the adversary. Thus the attack forces election officials to choose between two undesirable options: Not to publish the election result or to play into the adversary’s hand and to publicize sensitive information We stress that the attack is different from extortion and not restricted to electronic voting systems.
    OriginalsprogEngelsk
    TitelElectronic Voting : Second International Joint Conference, E-Vote-ID 2017, Bregenz, Austria, October 24-27, 2017, Proceedings
    Antal sider11
    UdgivelsesstedBregenz/Lochau
    ForlagSpringer
    Publikationsdato24 okt. 2017
    Sider280-291
    ISBN (Trykt)978-3-319-68686-8
    ISBN (Elektronisk)978-3-319-68687-5
    DOI
    StatusUdgivet - 24 okt. 2017
    NavnLecture Notes in Computer Science
    Vol/bind10615
    ISSN0302-9743

    Emneord

    • voting systems
    • covert attack
    • election security
    • sensitive information disclosure
    • adversarial influence

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