# Computation of Stackelberg equilibria of finite sequential games

Branislav Bosanski, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen, Troels Bjerre Lund

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## Abstrakt

The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
Originalsprog Engelsk 23 ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation 5 4 2167-8375 https://doi.org/10.1145/3133242 Udgivet - 2017

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