TY - JOUR
T1 - Computation of Stackelberg equilibria of finite sequential games
AU - Bosanski, Branislav
AU - Branzei, Simina
AU - Hansen, Kristoffer Arnsfelt
AU - Miltersen, Peter Bro
AU - Lund, Troels Bjerre
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
AB - The Stackelberg equilibrium is a solution concept that describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (the leader) first commits to a strategy that is publicly announced, then Player 2 (the follower) plays a best response to the leader’s choice. We study the problem of computing Stackelberg equilibria in finite sequential (i.e., extensive-form) games and provide new exact algorithms, approximation algorithms, and hardness results for finding equilibria for several classes of such two-player games.
U2 - 10.1145/3133242
DO - 10.1145/3133242
M3 - Journal article
SN - 2167-8375
VL - 5
JO - ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
JF - ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation
IS - 4
M1 - 23
ER -