Abstract
Abstract. Electronic voting schemes typically ensure ballot privacy by
assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot.
However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where
all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy.
In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while
casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic
techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.
assuming that the decryption key is distributed among tallying authorities, preventing any single authority from decrypting a voter’s ballot.
However, this assumption may fail in a fully dishonest environment where
all tallying authorities collude to break ballot privacy.
In this work, we introduce the notion of anamorphic voting, which enables voters to convey their true voting intention to an auditor while
casting an (apparently) regular ballot. We present new cryptographic
techniques demonstrating that several existing voting schemes can support anamorphic voting.
| Originalsprog | Engelsk |
|---|---|
| Titel | Financial Cryptography and Data Security. FC 2025 International Workshops - Voting |
| Antal sider | 15 |
| Publikationsdato | 2025 |
| Sider | 266-280 |
| DOI | |
| Status | Udgivet - 2025 |